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authorDamien Neil <dneil@google.com>2023-06-28 13:20:08 -0700
committerDamien Neil <dneil@google.com>2023-06-29 17:00:06 +0000
commit499458f7ca04087958987a33c2703c3ef03e27e2 (patch)
treeba0a1dc6e81eb34d677972cb9613ff760bb93e33 /src/net/http/request.go
parentfe73c186eba2c849a2f2aeaca091ddb5bac3aef1 (diff)
downloadgo-499458f7ca04087958987a33c2703c3ef03e27e2.tar.xz
net/http: validate Host header before sending
Verify that the Host header we send is valid. Avoids surprising behavior such as a Host of "go.dev\r\nX-Evil:oops" adding an X-Evil header to HTTP/1 requests. Add a test, skip the test for HTTP/2. HTTP/2 is not vulnerable to header injection in the way HTTP/1 is, but x/net/http2 doesn't validate the header and will go into a retry loop when the server rejects it. CL 506995 adds the necessary validation to x/net/http2. For #60374 Change-Id: I05cb6866a9bead043101954dfded199258c6dd04 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/506996 Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net/http/request.go')
-rw-r--r--src/net/http/request.go47
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 37 deletions
diff --git a/src/net/http/request.go b/src/net/http/request.go
index 4e9190493c..bd868373c5 100644
--- a/src/net/http/request.go
+++ b/src/net/http/request.go
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
"io"
"mime"
"mime/multipart"
- "net"
"net/http/httptrace"
"net/http/internal/ascii"
"net/textproto"
@@ -27,6 +26,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"sync"
+ "golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
"golang.org/x/net/idna"
)
@@ -580,12 +580,19 @@ func (r *Request) write(w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders Header, waitF
// is not given, use the host from the request URL.
//
// Clean the host, in case it arrives with unexpected stuff in it.
- host := cleanHost(r.Host)
+ host := r.Host
if host == "" {
if r.URL == nil {
return errMissingHost
}
- host = cleanHost(r.URL.Host)
+ host = r.URL.Host
+ }
+ host, err = httpguts.PunycodeHostPort(host)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) {
+ return errors.New("http: invalid Host header")
}
// According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other
@@ -742,40 +749,6 @@ func idnaASCII(v string) (string, error) {
return idna.Lookup.ToASCII(v)
}
-// cleanHost cleans up the host sent in request's Host header.
-//
-// It both strips anything after '/' or ' ', and puts the value
-// into Punycode form, if necessary.
-//
-// Ideally we'd clean the Host header according to the spec:
-//
-// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-5.4 (Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]")
-// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-2.7 (uri-host -> rfc3986's host)
-// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2 (definition of host)
-//
-// But practically, what we are trying to avoid is the situation in
-// issue 11206, where a malformed Host header used in the proxy context
-// would create a bad request. So it is enough to just truncate at the
-// first offending character.
-func cleanHost(in string) string {
- if i := strings.IndexAny(in, " /"); i != -1 {
- in = in[:i]
- }
- host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(in)
- if err != nil { // input was just a host
- a, err := idnaASCII(in)
- if err != nil {
- return in // garbage in, garbage out
- }
- return a
- }
- a, err := idnaASCII(host)
- if err != nil {
- return in // garbage in, garbage out
- }
- return net.JoinHostPort(a, port)
-}
-
// removeZone removes IPv6 zone identifier from host.
// E.g., "[fe80::1%en0]:8080" to "[fe80::1]:8080"
func removeZone(host string) string {