Sync with 2.39.4

* maint-2.39: (38 commits)
  Git 2.39.4
  fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
  core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
  init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
  clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
  Add a helper function to compare file contents
  init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
  find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
  clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
  entry: report more colliding paths
  t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
  submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
  clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
  submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
  clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
  t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
  has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
  docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
  upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default
  fetch/clone: detect dubious ownership of local repositories
  ...

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/dir.c b/dir.c
index 4e99f0c868..903633760c 100644
--- a/dir.c
+++ b/dir.c
@@ -88,6 +88,18 @@ int fspathncmp(const char *a, const char *b, size_t count)
 	return ignore_case ? strncasecmp(a, b, count) : strncmp(a, b, count);
 }
 
+int paths_collide(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+	size_t len_a = strlen(a), len_b = strlen(b);
+
+	if (len_a == len_b)
+		return fspatheq(a, b);
+
+	if (len_a < len_b)
+		return is_dir_sep(b[len_a]) && !fspathncmp(a, b, len_a);
+	return is_dir_sep(a[len_b]) && !fspathncmp(a, b, len_b);
+}
+
 unsigned int fspathhash(const char *str)
 {
 	return ignore_case ? strihash(str) : strhash(str);