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| author | Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> | 2025-03-25 10:38:29 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 2025-03-25 04:45:56 -0700 |
| commit | 03a4e46d122d5f24b6e1cd872eb996851c1563da (patch) | |
| tree | cd2af28eb6588e612994ead041381f32bf262c3f | |
| parent | 683c54c999c301c2cd6f715c411407c413b1d84e (diff) | |
| download | git-03a4e46d122d5f24b6e1cd872eb996851c1563da.tar.xz | |
mingw: special-case administrators even more
The check for dubious ownership has one particular quirk on Windows: if
running as an administrator, files owned by the Administrators _group_
are considered owned by the user.
The rationale for that is: When running in elevated mode, Git creates
files that aren't owned by the individual user but by the Administrators
group.
There is yet another quirk, though: The check I introduced to determine
whether the current user is an administrator uses the
`CheckTokenMembership()` function with the current process token. And
that check only succeeds when running in elevated mode!
Let's be a bit more lenient here and look harder whether the current
user is an administrator. We do this by looking for a so-called "linked
token". That token exists when administrators run in non-elevated mode,
and can be used to create a new process in elevated mode. And feeding
_that_ token to the `CheckTokenMembership()` function succeeds!
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | compat/mingw.c | 39 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/compat/mingw.c b/compat/mingw.c index f524c54d06..305a999f1f 100644 --- a/compat/mingw.c +++ b/compat/mingw.c @@ -2826,31 +2826,44 @@ static void setup_windows_environment(void) } } -static PSID get_current_user_sid(void) +static void get_current_user_sid(PSID *sid, HANDLE *linked_token) { HANDLE token; DWORD len = 0; - PSID result = NULL; + TOKEN_ELEVATION_TYPE elevationType; + DWORD size; + + *sid = NULL; + *linked_token = NULL; if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token)) - return NULL; + return; if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &len)) { TOKEN_USER *info = xmalloc((size_t)len); if (GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, info, len, &len)) { len = GetLengthSid(info->User.Sid); - result = xmalloc(len); - if (!CopySid(len, result, info->User.Sid)) { + *sid = xmalloc(len); + if (!CopySid(len, *sid, info->User.Sid)) { error(_("failed to copy SID (%ld)"), GetLastError()); - FREE_AND_NULL(result); + FREE_AND_NULL(*sid); } } FREE_AND_NULL(info); } - CloseHandle(token); - return result; + if (GetTokenInformation(token, TokenElevationType, &elevationType, sizeof(elevationType), &size) && + elevationType == TokenElevationTypeLimited) { + /* + * The current process is run by a member of the Administrators + * group, but is not running elevated. + */ + if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenLinkedToken, linked_token, sizeof(*linked_token), &size)) + linked_token = NULL; /* there is no linked token */ + } + + CloseHandle(token); } static BOOL user_sid_to_user_name(PSID sid, LPSTR *str) @@ -2931,18 +2944,22 @@ int is_path_owned_by_current_sid(const char *path, struct strbuf *report) else if (sid && IsValidSid(sid)) { /* Now, verify that the SID matches the current user's */ static PSID current_user_sid; + static HANDLE linked_token; BOOL is_member; if (!current_user_sid) - current_user_sid = get_current_user_sid(); + get_current_user_sid(¤t_user_sid, &linked_token); if (current_user_sid && IsValidSid(current_user_sid) && EqualSid(sid, current_user_sid)) result = 1; else if (IsWellKnownSid(sid, WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid) && - CheckTokenMembership(NULL, sid, &is_member) && - is_member) + ((CheckTokenMembership(NULL, sid, &is_member) && + is_member) || + (linked_token && + CheckTokenMembership(linked_token, sid, &is_member) && + is_member))) /* * If owned by the Administrators group, and the * current user is an administrator, we consider that |
