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We now have a (well, two, depending on AES hardware support) universal
cipher suite preference order, based on their security and performance.
Peer and application lists are now treated as filters (and AES hardware
support hints) that are applied to this universal order.
This removes a complex and nuanced decision from the application's
responsibilities, one which we are better equipped to make and which
applications usually don't need to have an opinion about. It also lets
us worry less about what suites we support or enable, because we can be
confident that bad ones won't be selected over good ones.
This also moves 3DES suites to InsecureCipherSuites(), even if they are
not disabled by default. Just because we can keep them as a last resort
it doesn't mean they are secure. Thankfully we had not promised that
Insecure means disabled by default.
Notable test changes:
- TestCipherSuiteCertPreferenceECDSA was testing that we'd pick the
right certificate regardless of CipherSuite ordering, which is now
completely ignored, as tested by TestCipherSuitePreference. Removed.
- The openssl command of TestHandshakeServerExportKeyingMaterial was
broken for TLS 1.0 in CL 262857, but its golden file was not
regenerated, so the test kept passing. It now broke because the
selected suite from the ones in the golden file changed.
- In TestAESCipherReordering, "server strongly prefers AES-GCM" is
removed because there is no way for a server to express a strong
preference anymore; "client prefers AES-GCM and AES-CBC over ChaCha"
switched to ChaCha20 when the server lacks AES hardware; and finally
"client supports multiple AES-GCM" changed to always prefer AES-128
per the universal preference list.
* this is going back on an explicit decision from CL 262857, and
while that client order is weird and does suggest a strong dislike
for ChaCha20, we have a strong dislike for software AES, so it
didn't feel worth making the logic more complex
- All Client-* golden files had to be regenerated because the
ClientHello cipher suites have changed.
(Even when Config.CipherSuites was limited to one suite, the TLS 1.3
default order changed.)
Fixes #45430
Fixes #41476 (as 3DES is now always the last resort)
Change-Id: If5f5d356c0f8d1f1c7542fb06644a478d6bad1e5
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/314609
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Support for Ed25519 certificates was added in CL 175478, this wires them
up into the TLS stack according to RFC 8422 (TLS 1.2) and RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3).
RFC 8422 also specifies support for TLS 1.0 and 1.1, and I initially
implemented that, but even OpenSSL doesn't take the complexity, so I
just dropped it. It would have required keeping a buffer of the
handshake transcript in order to do the direct Ed25519 signatures. We
effectively need to support TLS 1.2 because it shares ClientHello
signature algorithms with TLS 1.3.
While at it, reordered the advertised signature algorithms in the rough
order we would want to use them, also based on what curves have fast
constant-time implementations.
Client and client auth tests changed because of the change in advertised
signature algorithms in ClientHello and CertificateRequest.
Fixes #25355
Change-Id: I9fdd839afde4fd6b13fcbc5cc7017fd8c35085ee
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/177698
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
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Since they are sent after the handshake in TLS 1.3, the client was not
actually consuming them, as it doesn't make any Read calls. They were
then sitting in the kernel receive buffer when the client would call
Close. The kernel would see that and send a RST, which would race the
closeNotify, causing errors.
Also, we get to trim 600 lines of useless test data.
Fixes #28852
Change-Id: I7517feab77dabab7504bfc111098ba09ea07ae5e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/151659
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
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Note that the SignatureSchemes passed to GetClientCertificate in TLS 1.2
are now filtered by the requested certificate type. This feels like an
improvement anyway, and the full list can be surfaced as well when
support for signature_algorithms_cert is added, which actually matches
the semantics of the CertificateRequest signature_algorithms in TLS 1.2.
Also, note a subtle behavior change in server side resumption: if a
certificate is requested but not required, and the resumed session did
not include one, it used not to invoke VerifyPeerCertificate. However,
if the resumed session did include a certificate, it would. (If a
certificate was required but not in the session, the session is rejected
in checkForResumption.) This inconsistency could be unexpected, even
dangerous, so now VerifyPeerCertificate is always invoked. Still not
consistent with the client behavior, which does not ever invoke
VerifyPeerCertificate on resumption, but it felt too surprising to
entirely change either.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: Ib2b0dbc30e659208dca3ac07d6c687a407d7aaaf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147599
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
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