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When a TLS server uses the information from the server_name extension in
a client hello, and the connection isn't resuming, it should return an
empty server_name extension in its server hello (or encrypted extensions
for TLS 1.3).
For TLS <1.3 we we do this in doFullHandshake(), by setting the
pre-existing serverHelloMsg.serverNameAck bool. We know that the
connection isn't resuming based on the context where this function is
called.
For TLS 1.3, a new encryptedExtensionsMsg.serverNameAck bool is added,
and populated as appropriate in sendServerParameters() based on whether
the conn was resumed or not. The encryptedExtensionsMsg marshalling is
updated to emit the encrypted extension based on that field.
These changes allow enabling the ServerNameExtensionServer-* bogo tests
that verify both the presence and absence of the server_name extension
based on the relevant specifications.
Resolves #74282
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I703bc2ec916b50906bdece7b7483a7faed7aa8e4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/684795
TryBot-Bypass: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
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Change-Id: I6a6a4656c1b47ba6bd652d4da18922cb6b80a8ab
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/675836
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Bypass: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
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This commit updates the pinned revision of BoringSSL that's used for the
BoGo integration test.
Doing this requires a few categories of config changes:
* ignoring a few new tests for features crypto/tls doesn't implement
* ignoring a few new tests that require further
investigation/classification, or that already have an associated
tracking issue
* updating the error map syntax to accommodate the upstream change that
allows a one-to-many mapping
One code change is required in the shim test process to adjust how we
tear down a connection after an error to account for an upstream change
in the test runner.
Previously, for error conditions we would immediately close the
connection when exiting the shim process. We instead need to do this in
a multi-step process:
1. Flush any pending TLS writes to surface any alerts the error
condition may have generated.
2. Close the write side of the TCP connection to signal we're not
writing anymore.
3. Read and discard any pending data from the peer.
4. Close the read side of the TCP connection to fully close the socket.
Without doing this unpredictable timing factors may result in spurious
test failures where:
1. The runner sends us data that produces an error.
2. We send an alert, and immediately tear down the connection.
3. The runner tries to perform a write, and hits an error because the
pipe is closed.
4. The runner fails the test with the pipe write error, before it reads
from the connection to see the expected alert.
With the new code we instead swallow the unrelated writes and the runner
sees our alert after its ignored write when it tries to read from the
conn. The alert is the expected test outcome, and so the test passes.
This was previously not an issue because the runner was discarding the
write errors.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: Ib72a1c5e693aac92144696c8bae888d5f3f6c32f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/683456
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
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The two bugs are very minor:
- We were trying to set the ConnectionState CurveID field even if the
RSA key exchange was in use
- We were sending the wrong alert from TLS 1.2 clients if none of the
certificate signature algorithms were supported
Change-Id: I6a6a46564f5a9f1a5d44e54fc59a650118ad67d5
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/675918
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
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When a TLS 1.3 client processes the server's encryptedExtensionsMsg it
should reject instances that contain duplicate extension types.
RFC 8446 §4.2 says:
There MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type in a given
extension block.
This update matches enforcement done in the client hello unmarshalling,
but applied to the TLS 1.3 encrypted extensions message unmarshalling.
Making this change also allows enabling the
DuplicateExtensionClient-TLS-TLS13 BoGo test.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5d2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673757
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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Previously if instances of the handshakeMessage interface returned false
from unmarshal(), indicating an umarshalling error, the crypto/tls
package would emit an unexpected_message alert. This commit changes to
use a decode_error alert for this condition instead.
The usage-pattern of the handshakeMessage interface is that we switch on
the message type, invoke a specific concrete handshakeMessage type's
unmarshal function, and then return it to the caller on success. At this
point the caller looks at the message type and can determine if the
message was unexpected or not. If it was unexpected, the call-sites emit
the correct error for that case. Only the caller knows the current
protocol state and allowed message types, not the generic handshake
decoding logic.
With the above in mind, if we find that within the unmarshal logic for
a specific message type that the data we have in hand doesn't match the
protocol syntax we should emit a decode_error. An unexpected_message
error isn't appropriate because we don't yet know if the message is
unexpected or not, only that the message can't be decoded based on the
spec's syntax for the type the message claimed to be.
Notably one unit test, TestQUICPostHandshakeKeyUpdate, had to have its
test data adjusted because it was previously not testing the right
thing: it was double-encoding the type & length prefix data for a key
update message and expecting the QUIC logic to reject it as an
inappropriate post-handshake message. In reality it was being rejected
sooner as an invalid key update message from the double-encoding and
this was masked by the previous alert for this condition matching the
expected alert.
Finally, changing our alert allows enabling a handful of BoGo tests
related to duplicate extensions of the form
"DuplicateExtension[Server|Client]-TLS-[TLS1|TLS11|TLS12|TLS13]". One
test remains skipped (DuplicateExtensionClient-TLS-TLS13), as it
requires additional follow-up.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5d1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673738
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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This implements RFC 9155 by removing support for SHA-1 algorithms:
- we don't advertise them in ClientHello and CertificateRequest
(where supportedSignatureAlgorithms is used directly)
- we don't select them in our ServerKeyExchange and CertificateVerify
(where supportedSignatureAlgorithms filters signatureSchemesForCertificate)
- we reject them in the peer's ServerKeyExchange and CertificateVerify
(where we check against the algorithms we advertised in ClientHello
and CertificateRequest)
Fixes #72883
Change-Id: I6a6a4656e2aafd2c38cdd32090d3d8a9a8047818
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/658216
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Updates the skip reason for the following BoGo tests:
* TLS-ECH-Client-TLS12SessionID
* SupportTicketsWithSessionID
* ResumeTLS12SessionID-TLS13
The crypto/tls package does not support session ID based resumption at
this time, and so any tests that rely on this support need to be
skipped.
Updates #72006
Updates #25228
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5d0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673737
TryBot-Bypass: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
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Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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The crypto/tls package produces the expected error for this test case,
and so it can be enabled.
Looking at the history of the relevant code it appears the TLS 1.3
implementation has always had the correct behaviour for HRR changing to
an unsupported group after the initial hello.
I think this test was skipped initially because at the time of
initial BoGo config commit we hadn't implemented the -curves argument
for the test shim yet, and this test relies on it. We later added
support for that flag alongside X25519Kyber768Draft00 KX and I think we
missed the chance to enable the test then.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5cf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673756
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
TryBot-Bypass: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
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When a pre-TLS 1.3 server processes a client hello message that
indicates compression methods that don't include the null compression
method, send an illegal parameter alert.
Previously we did this for TLS 1.3 server handshakes only, and the
legacy TLS versions used alertHandshakeFailure for this circumstance. By
switching this to alertIllegalParameter we use a consistent alert across
all TLS versions, and can also enable the NoNullCompression-TLS12 BoGo
test we were skipping.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5ce
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673736
TryBot-Bypass: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
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When a crypto/tls client using TLS < 1.3 sends supported elliptic_curves
in a client hello message the server must limit itself to choosing one
of the supported options from our message. If we process a server key
exchange message that chooses an unadvertised curve, abort the
handshake w/ an error.
Previously we would not note that the server chose a curve we didn't
include in the client hello message, and would proceed with the
handshake as long as the chosen curve was one that we've implemented.
However, RFC 8422 5.1 makes it clear this is a server acting
out-of-spec, as it says:
If a server does not understand the Supported Elliptic Curves
Extension, does not understand the Supported Point Formats Extension,
or is unable to complete the ECC handshake while restricting itself
to the enumerated curves and point formats, it MUST NOT negotiate the
use of an ECC cipher suite.
Changing our behaviour to enforce this also allows enabling the
UnsupportedCurve BoGo test.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5cc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673735
TryBot-Bypass: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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Previously the common Config.mutualVersion() code prioritized the
selected version based on the provided peerVersions being sent in peer
preference order.
Instead we would prefer to see TLS 1.3 used whenever it is
supported, even if the peer would prefer an older protocol version.
This commit updates mutualVersions() to implement this policy change.
Our new behaviour matches the behaviour of other TLS stacks, notably
BoringSSL, and so also allows enabling the IgnoreClientVersionOrder BoGo
test that we otherwise must skip.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5cb
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673236
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
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Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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The BoGo IgnoreClientVersionOrder test checks that a client that sends
a supported_versions extension with the list [TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3] ends up
negotiating TLS 1.3.
However, the crypto/tls module treats this list as being in client
preference order, and so negotiates TLS 1.2, failing the test.
Our behaviour appears to be the correct handling based on RFC 8446
§4.2.1 where it says:
The extension contains a list of supported versions in preference
order, with the most preferred version first.
This commit updates the reason we skip this test to cite the RFC instead
of saying it's something to be fixed.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5ca
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/671415
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
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If the client hello legacy version is >= TLS 1.3, and no
supported_versions extension is sent, negotiate TLS 1.2 or lower when
supported.
On the topic of supported version negotiation RFC 8446 4.2.1 indicates
TLS 1.3 implementations MUST send a supported_versions extension with
a list of their supported protocol versions. The crypto/tls package
enforces this when the client hello legacy version indicates TLS 1.3
(0x0304), aborting the handshake with an alertMissingExtension alert if
no supported_versions were received.
However, section 4.2.1 indicates different behaviour should be used when
the extension is not present and TLS 1.2 or prior are supported:
If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with
this specification and which also support TLS 1.2 MUST negotiate
TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in [RFC5246], even if
ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later.
This commit updates the client hello processing logic to allow this
behaviour. If no supported_versions extension was received we ignore the
legacy version being >= TLS 1.3 and instead negotiate a lower supported
version if the server configuration allows.
This fix in turn allows enabling the BoGo ClientHelloVersionTooHigh,
MinorVersionTolerance, and MajorVersionTolerance tests.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5c9
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/671235
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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Previously for protocol versions older than TLS 1.3 our server handshake
implementation sent an alertBadCertificate alert in the case where the
server TLS config indicates a client cert is required and none was
received.
This commit updates the relevant logic to instead send
alertHandshakeFailure in these circumstances.
For TLS 1.2, RFC 5246 §7.4.6 unambiguously describes this as the correct
alert:
If the client does not send any certificates, the
server MAY at its discretion either continue the handshake without
client authentication, or respond with a fatal handshake_failure
alert.
The TLS 1.1 and 1.0 specs also describe using this alert (RFC 4346 §7.4.6
and RFC 2246 §7.4.6) both say:
If client authentication is required by the server for the handshake
to continue, it may respond with a fatal handshake failure alert.
Making this correction also allows enabling the
RequireAnyClientCertificate-TLS1* bogo tests.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5c8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/671195
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Previously a handful of large record tests were in the bogo config
ignore list. The ignored tests were failing because they used
insecure ciphersuites that aren't enabled by default.
This commit adds the non-default insecure ciphersuites to the bogo
TLS configuration and re-enables the tests. Doing this uncovered
a handful of unrelated tests that needed to be fixed, each handled
before this commit.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5c7
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/669158
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
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These two bogo tests mutate the version number used for the premaster
secret calculation for a client RSA key exchange, with the expectation
the server rejects the handshake.
Per the comment in the end of rsaKeyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange
we explicitly choose *not* to verify the version number.
This commit adds the two version number tests to the ignore list. They
coincidentally happen to produced the expected failure because they use
a non-default ciphersuite. When we add this ciphersuite to the client
config for the bogo test they will start to fail unless ignored.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5c6
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/669175
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If a client or server explicitly offers point formats, and the point
formats don't include the uncompressed format, then error. This matches
BoringSSL and Rustls behaviour and allows enabling the
PointFormat-Client-MissingUncompressed bogo test.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5c5
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/669157
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
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Unlike in earlier TLS versions, in TLS 1.3 when processing a server
hello the legacy_compression_method MUST have the value 0. It is no
longer a parameter that offers a choice of compression method.
With this in mind, it seems more appropriate to return a decode error
when we encounter a non-zero compression method in a server hello
message. We haven't found a parameter value we reject, we've found
a message that doesn't decode according to its specification.
Making this change also aligns with BoringSSL and allows enabling the
TLS13-HRR-InvalidCompressionMethod bogo test.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5c4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/669156
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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Previously if the clientHandshakeState for the TLS 1.2 client code
encountered a server helo message that contained a compression method
other than compressionNone, we would emit an unexpected message alert.
Instead, it seems more appropriate to return an illegal parameter alert.
The server hello message _was_ expected, it just contained a bad
parameter option.
Making this change also allows enabling the InvalidCompressionMethod
bogo test.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5c3
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/669155
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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If we weren't resuming an existing session, and we constructed a TLS 1.3
compatible client hello, ensure the server doesn't echo back the
made up compatibility session ID if we end up handshaking for TLS 1.2.
As part of an effort to make the initial stages of a TLS 1.3 handshake
compatible with TLS 1.2 middleboxes, TLS 1.3 requires that the client
hello contain a non-empty legacy_session_id value. For anti-ossification
purposes it's recommended this ID be randomly generated. This is the
strategy the crypto/tls package takes.
When we follow this approach, but then end up negotiating TLS 1.2, the
server should not have echoed back that random ID to us. It's impossible
for the server to have had a session with a matching ID and so it is
misbehaving and it's prudent for our side to abort the handshake.
See RFC 8446 Section 4.1.2 for more detail:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446#section-4.1.2
Adopting this behaviour allows un-ignoring the BoGo
EchoTLS13CompatibilitySessionID testcase.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I1e52075177a13a7aa103b45498eae38d8a4c34b9
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Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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For malformed client/server certificates in a TLS handshake send
a decode_error alert, matching BoringSSL behaviour.
Previously crypto/tls used a bad_certificate alert for this purpose.
The TLS specification is imprecise enough to allow this to be considered
a spec. justified choice, but since all other places in the protocol
encourage using decode_error for structurally malformed messages we may
as well do the same here and get some extra cross-impl consistency for
free.
This also allows un-ignoring the BoGo
GarbageCertificate-[Client|Server]-[TLS12|TLS13] tests.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: Ide45ba1602816e71c3289a60e77587266c3b9036
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Previously this test was skipped without a comment clarifying why. In
practice it's because crypto/tls doesn't generate GREASE extensions at
this time, and the test expects to find one in the NewSessionTicket
message extensions produced by a server.
We're already skipping some other GREASE related test as
not-yet-implemented without explicit bogo_config.json exclusion by way
of the -enable-grease flag not being implemented, however for TLS
1.3 servers the BoGo expectation is that they _always_ send GREASE, and
so the -enable-grease flag isn't provided and an explicit skip must be
used.
We should revisit this alongside implementing GREASE ext production in
general for both clients and servers.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I8af4b555ac8c32cad42215fbf26aa0feae90fa21
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/650717
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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When encountering alertUserCanceled in a TLS 1.3 handshake, ignore the
alert and retry reading a record. This matches existing logic for how
TLS 1.2 alertLevelWarning alerts are handled.
For broader context, TLS 1.3 removed warning-level alerts except for
alertUserCanceled (RFC 8446, § 6.1). Since at least one major
implementation (https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8323517)
misuses this alert, many TLS stacks now ignore it outright when seen in
a TLS 1.3 handshake (e.g. BoringSSL, NSS, Rustls).
With the crypto/tls behaviour changed to match peer implementations we
can now enable the "SendUserCanceledAlerts-TLS13" BoGo test.
"SendUserCanceledAlerts-TooMany-TLS13" remains ignored, because like
"SendWarningAlerts*" fixing the test requires some general spam
protocol message enhancements be done first.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I570c1fa674b5a4760836c514d35ee17f746fe28d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/650716
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This commit removes SkipNewSessionTicket from the bogo_config.json
excluded tests list.
Previously this test was being skipped with a TODO that there might be
a bug here. In practice it seems like there's no bug and the test is
handled correctly by crypto/tls.
When activated, a TLS 1.2 client connecting to the bogo dispatcher goes
through the normal handshake process with the exception that the server
skips sending the NewSessionTicket msg expected by the client in
response to the client's final flight of handshake msgs.
The crypto/tls TLS 1.2 client_handshake.go logic correctly rejects the
unexpected message that follows (ChangeCipherSpec) when trying to read
the bytes necessary to unmarshal the expected NewSessionTicket message
that was omitted.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I9faea4d18589d10b163211aa17b2d0da8af1187e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/650736
Reviewed-by: Junyang Shao <shaojunyang@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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While not clearly motivated by normative language in RFC 8446 it seems
clear that an empty opaque ticket value is non-operable, and so we
should reject it with an appropriate alert/error.
This allows removing the SendEmptySessionTicket-TLS13 BoGo test from the
bogo excluded tests configuration.
Fixes #70513
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I589b34e86fb1eb27a349a230e920c22284597cde
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/650735
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
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We don't support SSLv2, at all.
Change-Id: Icd0579b81393fbd82bf5b4d961470928faa7d09d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/644017
Reviewed-by: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
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When ECH is rejected, properly take retry configs from the encrypted
extensions message. Also fix the bogo shim to properly test for this
behavior.
We should properly map the full BoringSSL -> Go errors so that we don't
run into a similar failure in the future, but this is left for a follow
up CL.
Fixes #70915
Change-Id: Icc1878ff6f87df059e7b83e0a431f50f1fea833c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/638583
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
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This makes three related changes that work particularly well together
and would require significant extra work to do separately: it replaces
X25519Kyber768Draft00 with X25519MLKEM768, it makes CurvePreferences
ordering crypto/tls-selected, and applies a preference to PQ key
exchange methods over key shares (to mitigate downgrades).
TestHandshakeServerUnsupportedKeyShare was removed because we are not
rejecting unsupported key shares anymore (nor do we select them, and
rejecting them actively is a MAY). It would have been nice to keep the
test to check we still continue successfully, but testClientHelloFailure
is broken in the face of any server-side behavior which requires writing
any other messages back to the client, or reading them.
Updates #69985
Fixes #69393
Change-Id: I58de76f5b8742a9bd4543fd7907c48e038507b19
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/630775
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
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Adds support for server-side ECH.
We make a couple of implementation decisions that are not completely
in-line with the spec. In particular, we don't enforce that the SNI
matches the ECHConfig public_name, and we implement a hybrid
shared/backend mode (rather than shared or split mode, as described in
Section 7). Both of these match the behavior of BoringSSL.
The hybrid server mode will either act as a shared mode server, where-in
the server accepts "outer" client hellos and unwraps them before
processing the "inner" hello, or accepts bare "inner" hellos initially.
This lets the server operate either transparently as a shared mode
server, or a backend server, in Section 7 terminology. This seems like
the best implementation choice for a TLS library.
Fixes #68500
Change-Id: Ife69db7c1886610742e95e76b0ca92587e6d7ed4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/623576
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
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Use the bogo JSON output format to make the test output more readable.
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.golang.try:gotip-linux-amd64-longtest
Change-Id: Ie1a67c6a031bc1d5d8b2cdfaf78d094a0967bc2a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/587955
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
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This CL adds a (very opinionated) client-side ECH implementation.
In particular, if a user configures a ECHConfigList, by setting the
Config.EncryptedClientHelloConfigList, but we determine that none of
the configs are appropriate, we will not fallback to plaintext SNI, and
will instead return an error. It is then up to the user to decide if
they wish to fallback to plaintext themselves (by removing the config
list).
Additionally if Config.EncryptedClientHelloConfigList is provided, we
will not offer TLS support lower than 1.3, since negotiating any other
version, while offering ECH, is a hard error anyway. Similarly, if a
user wishes to fallback to plaintext SNI by using 1.2, they may do so
by removing the config list.
With regard to PSK GREASE, we match the boringssl behavior, which does
not include PSK identities/binders in the outer hello when doing ECH.
If the server rejects ECH, we will return a ECHRejectionError error,
which, if provided by the server, will contain a ECHConfigList in the
RetryConfigList field containing configs that should be used if the user
wishes to retry. It is up to the user to replace their existing
Config.EncryptedClientHelloConfigList with the retry config list.
Fixes #63369
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.golang.try:gotip-linux-amd64-longtest
Change-Id: I9bc373c044064221a647a388ac61624efd6bbdbf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/578575
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
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Forced the testConfig CurvePreferences to exclude X25519Kyber768Draft00
to avoid bloating the transcripts, but I manually tested it and the
tests all update and pass successfully, causing 7436 insertions(+), 3251
deletions(-).
Fixes #67061
Change-Id: If6f13bca561835777ab0889a490487b7c2366c3c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/586656
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
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Run the BoGo test suite.
For now a number of tests are disabled, so that we can land the shim.
Once the shim is in the tree I'll work on fixing tests, and aligning
the TLS stack with the boringssl stack.
Eventually we should also remove the --loose-errors flag.
Fixes #51434
Change-Id: Ic8339fc34552936b798acf834011a129e375750e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/486495
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
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