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By returning error with %w, the caller can check and convert the error
using errors.As, for example to knownhosts.KeyError.
Change-Id: I0529e2e935cd8075f87aa6f6049cee3323f82c06
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Also fix some redundant type declarations.
Change-Id: Iad2950b67b1ec2e2590c59393b8ad15421ed3add
GitHub-Last-Rev: 41cf552f11387208491dee7b867050475043b25e
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#263
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/505798
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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This group is disabled by default because it is a bit slower than
the others.
The group18-sha512 variant is too slow to include.
Benchstat results including diffie-hellman-group18-sha512:
name time/op
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256-12 22.6ms ± 9%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group18-sha512-12 1.15s ±11%
Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp384-12 3.91ms ± 6%
Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp256-12 304µs ± 5%
Kexes/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org-12 413µs ± 7%
Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp521-12 11.6ms ±13%
Kexes/curve25519-sha256-12 361µs ± 5%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1-12 22.9ms ± 9%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group1-sha1-12 3.59ms ± 6%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha1-12 22.1ms ±11%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha256-12 21.6ms ± 8%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group16-sha512-12 138ms ± 9%
name alloc/op
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256-12 67.8kB ± 1%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group18-sha512-12 243kB ± 9%
Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp384-12 13.9kB ± 0%
Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp256-12 12.1kB ± 0%
Kexes/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org-12 8.22kB ± 0%
Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp521-12 16.5kB ± 0%
Kexes/curve25519-sha256-12 8.22kB ± 0%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1-12 67.5kB ± 0%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group1-sha1-12 34.9kB ± 0%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha1-12 61.9kB ± 0%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha256-12 62.0kB ± 0%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group16-sha512-12 117kB ± 0%
name allocs/op
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256-12 314 ± 0%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group18-sha512-12 271 ± 4%
Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp384-12 243 ± 0%
Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp256-12 213 ± 0%
Kexes/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org-12 168 ± 0%
Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp521-12 245 ± 0%
Kexes/curve25519-sha256-12 168 ± 0%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1-12 314 ± 0%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group1-sha1-12 255 ± 0%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha1-12 255 ± 0%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha256-12 255 ± 0%
Kexes/diffie-hellman-group16-sha512-12 256 ± 0%
Change-Id: Id119401fda7e417675325f37e3d442e70585206c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/506839
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Tighter validation could cause backwards incompatibility issues, eg
configurations with valid and invalid MACs, KEXs, ciphers currently work
if a supported algorithm is negotiated and that's also the scenario of
removing support for an existing algorithm.
Fixes golang/go#39397
Change-Id: If90253ba89e1d8f732cc1e1c3d24fe0a1e2dac71
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/512175
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
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sha256 is more optimized than sha512 in Go and is secure enough
so prefer sha256 over sha512.
Change-Id: I3fcf7457791e3ef4539e97049aa905dcd293499d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/507556
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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ssh-agent is implemented as a Windows service and exposed on a
named pipe. We don't currently support it.
See golang/go#60981
Change-Id: Iebdc42db30b37a87ac0766231b16aff3f17b3f56
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/509035
Run-TryBot: Heschi Kreinick <heschi@google.com>
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add leading `echo` to have better compatibility
before
```
go test -run ^TestValidTerminalMode -v
=== RUN TestValidTerminalMode
session_test.go:261: echo SHELL $SHELL && stty -a && exit:
Last login: Thu Jul 6 12:24:38 2023 from 192.168.200.1
SHELL /bin/bashubuntu:~$
speed 38400 baud; rows 80; columns 40;
line = 0;
intr = ^C; quit = ^\; erase = ^?;
kill = ^U; eof = ^D; eol = <undef>;
eol2 = <undef>; swtch = <undef>;
start = ^Q; stop = ^S; susp = ^Z;
rprnt = ^R; werase = ^W; lnext = ^V;
discard = ^O; min = 1; time = 0;
-parenb -parodd -cmspar cs8 -hupcl
-cstopb cread -clocal -crtscts
-ignbrk -brkint -ignpar -parmrk -inpck
-istrip -inlcr -igncr icrnl ixon -ixoff
-iuclc -ixany -imaxbel -iutf8
opost -olcuc -ocrnl onlcr -onocr -onlret
-ofill -ofdel nl0 cr0 tab0 bs0 vt0 ff0
isig icanon iexten -echo echoe echok
-echonl -noflsh -xcase -tostop -echoprt
echoctl echoke -flusho -extproc
logout
session_test.go:266: missing output from echo SHELL $SHELL
```
after
```
go test -run ^TestValidTerminalMode -v
=== RUN TestValidTerminalMode
session_test.go:261: echo SHELL $SHELL && stty -a && exit:
Last login: Thu Jul 6 12:24:38 2023 from 192.168.200.1
bolian@ubuntu:~$
SHELL /bin/bash
speed 38400 baud; rows 80; columns 40;
line = 0;
intr = ^C; quit = ^\; erase = ^?;
kill = ^U; eof = ^D; eol = <undef>;
eol2 = <undef>; swtch = <undef>;
start = ^Q; stop = ^S; susp = ^Z;
rprnt = ^R; werase = ^W; lnext = ^V;
discard = ^O; min = 1; time = 0;
-parenb -parodd -cmspar cs8 -hupcl
-cstopb cread -clocal -crtscts
-ignbrk -brkint -ignpar -parmrk -inpck
-istrip -inlcr -igncr icrnl ixon -ixoff
-iuclc -ixany -imaxbel -iutf8
opost -olcuc -ocrnl onlcr -onocr -onlret
-ofill -ofdel nl0 cr0 tab0 bs0 vt0 ff0
isig icanon iexten -echo echoe echok
-echonl -noflsh -xcase -tostop -echoprt
echoctl echoke -flusho -extproc
logout
--- PASS: TestValidTerminalMode (0.06s)
```
Change-Id: If60c040edb8c78a7d86bf58a6be47636d9e8f173
GitHub-Last-Rev: a2cc1b1af09e47df82fcb8685d829dfed945e8b0
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#264
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/508115
Reviewed-by: Heschi Kreinick <heschi@google.com>
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After adding support for rsa-sha2-256/512 on the server side some edge
cases started to arise with old clients:
1) public key authentication with gpg-agent < 2.2.6 fails because we
receive ssh-rsa as signature format and rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512
as algorithm.
This is a bug in gpg-agent fixed in this commit:
https://github.com/gpg/gnupg/commit/80b775bdbb852aa4a80292c9357e5b1876110c00
2) certificate authentication fails with OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 because we
receive ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com as algorithm and rsa-sha2-256
or rsa-sha2-512 as signature format.
This patch is based on CL 412854 and has been tested with every version
of OpenSSH from 7.1 to 7.9 and OpenSSH 9.3.
Fixes golang/go#53391
Change-Id: Id71f596f73d84efb5c76d6d5388432cccad3e3b1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/506835
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sha256 is more optimized than sha512 in Go and is secure enough
so prefer sha256 over sha512.
Fixes golang/go#61138
Change-Id: I7658808655367f1ab5f4ac8b52e6b20bd30ebf87
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/507555
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This adds support for hmac-sha2-512 to ensure compatibility with SSH clients that request this MAC algorithm.
This rebases https://github.com/golang/crypto/pull/18.
Change-Id: Ia103c10a8b7e2e8dde556d5c36550eb5fa6bc1f6
GitHub-Last-Rev: 987ccae2bc7ae5e90a482d8797351c39dcb9bf33
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#257
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/501455
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
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This uses a copy of testenv.Command copied from the main repo, with
light edits to allow the testenv helpers to build with Go 1.19.
The testenv helper revealed an exec.Command leak in TestCertLogin, so
we also fix that leak and simplify server cleanup using
testing.T.Cleanup.
For golang/go#60099.
Fixes golang/go#60343.
Change-Id: I7f79fcdb559498b987ee7689972ac53b83870aaf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/496935
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Change-Id: I0203881afd7ad72e68f76650817451d7e292c91b
GitHub-Last-Rev: 42b4119e1987e7a46aa06a2b142d5fd3ef6f216a
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#129
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/226982
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Change-Id: Icf9c867e64ef68f6f46dd7d4cec07cf7c315c2ad
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/490155
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Updates golang/go#32840
Updates golang/go#58141
Change-Id: Ib4425c1743d417920745205586af250dbf80c7e4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/485695
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Fixes golang/go#38037.
Change-Id: Ide77dddc9f57b3f0318a419a1474e11215623b64
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/485175
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Change-Id: Ia0410f1f3bb0a9ee68c6dbe1e6f62f65f9e00955
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/477755
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
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From CL 173457 and CL 235358.
Change-Id: Ia46ab9c7e2c57472df3126ddc7050f0068fcaab9
GitHub-Last-Rev: c38e379355602fe4ff11ff65f98c296d5c326281
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#146
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/241282
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Change-Id: I91caf3bda3dfd00c050f5ebf23c2a35a04c5762b
GitHub-Last-Rev: 6e71340e7960b5b6f71f7b96eeeaf8dfb268e306
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#127
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/223518
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Change-Id: I11030ee466c8cac6855ce4fe2cf72e0b8d7029f8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/463796
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returns
This fixes a data race in the tests for x/crypto/ssh, which expects to
be able to examine a transport's read and write counters without
locking after closing it.
(Given the number of goroutines, channels, and mutexes used in this
package, I wouldn't be surprised if other concurrency bugs remain.
I would suggest simplifying the concurrency in this package, but I
don't intend to follow up on that myself at the moment.)
Fixes golang/go#56957.
Change-Id: Ib1f1390b66707c66a3608e48f3f52483cff3c1f5
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/456758
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This lets clients know we support rsa-sha2-256/512 signatures from
ssh-rsa public keys. OpenSSH prefers to break the connection rather than
attempting trial and error, apparently.
We don't enable support for the "ext-info-s" because we're not
interested in any client->server extensions.
This also replaces isAcceptableAlgo which was rejecting the
rsa-sha2-256/512-cert-v01@openssh.com public key algorithms.
Tested with OpenSSH 9.1 on macOS Ventura.
Fixes golang/go#49269
Updates golang/go#49952
Co-authored-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Kristin Davidson <kdavidson@atlassian.com>
Change-Id: I4955c3b12bb45575e9977ac657bb5805b49d00c3
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/447757
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Change-Id: I560d7f5a62161cd88361a9fe9982d36f8e25e5af
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/447475
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pkgsite automatically links /RFC \d+/ to the mentioned RFC. Insert a
bunch of spaces into doc-comments for that to match.
Change-Id: I01834d7573428563f21c37e43316442e148dd8c4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/442055
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Change-Id: Iac9c8f06b874e62b56f634dede8757b87514f421
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/442135
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It was possible to accept auth type "none" before, but not dynamically
at runtime as a function of the ConnMetadata like the other auth types'
callback hooks.
Fixes golang/go#51994
Change-Id: I83ea80901d4977d8f78523e3d1e16e0a7df5b172
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/395314
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Change-Id: I911366b91ff2a1d02d7de202a166d876fb873142
GitHub-Last-Rev: f50e00376856fb9da36bb98ed0cdfd96c2f3b304
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#233
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/438536
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For golang/go#45557
Change-Id: I447530cc66896aef7a8d528ccb8d095b80e3cf47
GitHub-Last-Rev: 5f385ff46487ac318bd1147cdbbd26bb0ffd0426
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#230
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/430797
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The OpenSSH wire format just suffixes the raw extension body,
without a nested string.
Fixes golang/go#51689
Change-Id: Ic224cedb934ba0563abca9a45a6be1c67769ed6d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/412154
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The type of ssh.PublicKey.Type can be a certificate type, while the
algorithm passed to SignWithAlgorithm is going to be an underlying
algorithm.
Fixes golang/go#52185
Change-Id: I0f7c46defa83d1fd64a3c1e861734650b20cca21
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/404614
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Gofmt to update doc comments to the new formatting.
For golang/go#51082.
Change-Id: I076031b6613691eefbb0f21739366e3fd2011ec9
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/399356
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In accordance to RFC8308, send ext-info-c only during the first key
exchange. Some server implementations such as OpenSSH 7 will send an
extInfoMsg message each time when ext-info-c is received. This results
in a closed connection, as our client does not expect this message while
handling the mux.
See https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2929 regarding the
behaviour of OpenSSH if it sees ext-info-c in later key exchanges.
Fixes golang/go#51808
Change-Id: Id94f1ef73cec6147136246b0b6048b57db92660d
GitHub-Last-Rev: fcfe5ed37306136219854031abc809e0dc9b3124
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#208
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/394134
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The server-sig-algs logic was not working for certificate algorithms.
Follow-up on CL 392394.
Tested with OpenSSH 8.8 configured with
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com
Updates golang/go#39885
For golang/go#49952
Change-Id: Ic230dd6f98e96b7938acbd0128ab37d33b70abe5
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CL 220037 had implemented support for host authentication using
rsa-sha2-256/512, but not client public key authentication. OpenSSH
disabled the SHA-1 based ssh-rsa by default in version 8.8 (after
pre-announcing it in versions 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7) although
some distributions re-enable it. GitHub will start rejecting ssh-rsa for
keys uploaded before November 2, 2021 on March 15, 2022.
https://github.blog/2021-09-01-improving-git-protocol-security-github/
The server side already worked, as long as the client selected one of
the SHA-2 algorithms, because the signature flowed freely to Verify.
There was however nothing verifying that the signature algorithm matched
the advertised one. The comment suggested the check was being performed,
but it got lost back in CL 86190043. Not a security issue because the
signature had to pass the callback's Verify method regardless, and both
values were checked to be acceptable.
Tested with OpenSSH 8.8 configured with "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes -ssh-rsa"
and no application-side changes.
The Signers returned by ssh/agent (when backed by an agent client)
didn't actually implement AlgorithmSigner but ParameterizedSigner, an
interface defined in an earlier version of CL 123955.
Updates golang/go#49269
Fixes golang/go#39885
For golang/go#49952
Change-Id: I13b41db8041f1112a70f106c55f077b904b12cb8
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The server side implementation was not actually populating the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST field with the
KeyboardInteractiveChallenge argument, although the client side was
deserializing it and passing it to the KeyboardInteractiveChallenge
callback.
Anyway, the first field of SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST is "name", not
"user". Maybe the confusion was due to the first field of
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST being the user.
RFC 4256, Section 3.3, says this about it
One possibility is to use the name field (possibly
prefixed with the application's name) as the title of a dialog window
in which the prompt(s) are presented.
and examples include "CRYPTOCard Authentication", "Password
Authentication", and "Password Expired".
Co-authored-by: Kevin Wallace <kevin@pentabarf.net>
Change-Id: Ic6ec0dfea2122704603c44f42898a980689a15c9
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/372234
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The server implementation looks at the HostKeys to advertise and
negotiate host key signature algorithms. A fundamental issue of the
Signer and AlgorithmSigner interfaces is that they don't expose the
supported signature algorithms, so really the server has to guess.
Currently, it would guess exclusively based on the PublicKey.Type,
regardless of whether the host key implemented AlgorithmSigner. This
means that a legacy Signer that only supports ssh-rsa still led the
server to negotiate rsa-sha2 algorithms. The server would then fail to
find a suitable host key to make the signature and crash.
This won't happen if only Signers from this package are used, but if a
custom Signer that doesn't support SignWithAlgorithm() but returns
"ssh-rsa" from PublicKey().Type() is used as a HostKey, the server is
vulnerable to DoS.
The only workable rules to determine what to advertise seems to be:
1. a pure Signer will always Sign with the PublicKey.Type
2. an AlgorithmSigner supports all algorithms associated with the
PublicKey.Type
Rule number two means that we can't add new supported algorithms in the
future, which is not great, but it's too late to fix that.
rsaSigner was breaking rule number one, and although it would have been
fine where it's used, I didn't want to break our own interface contract.
It's unclear why we had separate test key entries for rsa-sha2
algorithms, since we can use the ssh-rsa key for those. The only test
that used them, TestCertTypes, seemed broken: the init was actually
failing at making the corresponding signers rsaSigners, and indeed the
test for the SHA-256 signer expected and checked a SHA-512 signature.
Pending CVE
For golang/go#49952
Change-Id: Ie658eefcadd87906e63fc7faae8249376aa96c79
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RFC 8332, Section 2 sets up two overlapping namespaces: public key
formats and public key algorithms.
* The formats are what we currently have KeyAlgo constants for, and they
appear in PublicKey.Type.
* The algorithms are the set of both KeyAlgo and SigAlgo constants, and
they appear in Signature.Format (amongst other places).
This is incoherent, because that means Signature.Format can be both a
KeyAlgo (like KeyAlgoECDSA256) or a SigAlgo (like SigAlgoRSASHA2256).
One solution would be to duplicate all the KeyAlgo constants into the
SigAlgo namespace, but that would be confusing because applications are
currently using KeyAlgos where they'd be supposed to use the new
SigAlgos (while we can't deprecate the KeyAlgos because they are still
necessary for the PublicKey.Type namespace).
Instead, drop the separate namespaces, and use KeyAlgos throughout.
There are simply some KeyAlgos that can't be a PublicKey.Type.
Take the opportunity to fix the stuttering SHA22565/SHA2512 names. It's
totally ok to call those hashes SHA-256 and SHA-512 without the family
infix.
For golang/go#49952
Change-Id: Ia1fce3912a7e60aa70a88f75ed311be331fd19d5
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The previous code
if gex.g.Cmp(one) != 1 && gex.g.Cmp(pMinusOne) != -1 {
deobfuscates to the classic mistake
if g <= 1 && g >= p - 1 {
which is never true.
What the code actually intended to do is
if gex.g.Cmp(one) != 1 || gex.g.Cmp(pMinusOne) != -1 {
or more readably and consistently with the diffieHellman method
if gex.g.Cmp(one) <= 0 || gex.g.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 {
Now, is this a security issue? The incorrect checks apply to g and k,
but not what we call Y and the spec calls f. RFC 4419 says:
Either side MUST NOT send or accept e or f values that are not in the
range [1, p-1]. If this condition is violated, the key exchange
fails. To prevent confinement attacks, they MUST accept the shared
secret K only if 1 < K < p - 1.
Note that RFC 8268, Section 4 updates the equivalent RFC 4253 statement
(although not the RFC 4419 one) about e and f, but we are already doing
the correct full check there.
DH Public Key values MUST be checked and both conditions:
1 < e < p-1
1 < f < p-1
MUST be true. Values not within these bounds MUST NOT be sent or
accepted by either side. If either one of these conditions is
violated, then the key exchange fails.
This simple check ensures that:
o The remote peer behaves properly.
o The local system is not forced into the two-element subgroup.
The check on K seems like a proxy for checking a number of ways to fix
the DH output (for example by manipulating g) to one of 0, 1, or -1.
This should not be meaningful to security for two reasons:
- all parameters end up in the "transcript" hash that will get signed
by the server's host key, and if the attacker controls the host
key's signature, they have the ability to MitM without resorting to
confinement attacks
- the client secret is ephemeral, so leaking bits of it by forcing it
into small sub-groups does not gain the attacker anything, as the
secret does not get reused
Indeed, this is the same explanation of why it's ok not to check that p
is indeed a (safe) prime, which even OpenSSH omits. Building an
equivalent attack by manipulating p instead of g is left as an exercise
to the reader.
For the future, this is a case study in why we should not add complexity
even when it looks easy enough to do. CL 174257 added the
diffie-hellman-group-exchange kex. That introduced a data race (arguably
a security issue), which was fixed in CL 222078. Then it was too slow,
which led to CL 252337 that removed the primalty check, which required a
full analysis of whether it's safe to skip it, and checking against
other implementations. Now we find there's a bug and we have to do
another security analysis that not even the RFC bothered to do in order
to decide if it's a security issue. My decision in
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/17230#issuecomment-489163656
does not look like the right one in hindsight.
While at it, clean up the code some
- drop useless bit size bounds logic in the server stub that get
ignored by the rest of the function
- make p and g local variables instead of method fields, since they
are not persistent state (this was originally a data race which was
fixed in CL 222078 by making Client not a pointer receiver)
Updates golang/go#17230
Change-Id: I4b1c68537109f627ccd75ec381dcfab57ce1768c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/392015
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RFC 9142 made diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 from RFC 8268 a MUST, and
it's strictly better than diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, which we already
have, and trivial to add.
> The method of key exchange used for the name "diffie-hellman-
> group14-sha256" is the same as that for "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
> except that the SHA256 hash algorithm is used.
Ignore the bigger groups which have a meaningful performance cost, and
don't share the same interoperability benefit.
Adapted from CL 387994.
Fixes golang/go#31731
Co-authored-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Change-Id: Id4ce345a2065840f193986739ea890f105a1e929
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/392014
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RFC 8731 standardized curve25519-sha256@libssh.org as curve25519-sha256,
and some systems only advertise support for the new name.
Fixes golang/go#48756
Change-Id: Ice35874cd8c07ad48752686ac368bf11ab793f77
Co-authored-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Change-Id: I65ac40d86c4f0ee5552cd2e167ac91a735f6c56e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/392134
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If the server/client cipher chosen is one of the two AEAD ciphers that
we support (aes128-gcm@openssh.com and chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com),
don't attempt to find a common MAC algorithm in findAgreedAlgorithms.
Similarly in newPacketCipher, don't attempt to generate a MAC key if we
are using a AEAD cipher.
Fixes golang/go#51406
Change-Id: Id48ae72f052cb0a0c597b32e9901a0f218e4161f
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Change-Id: I5832916eb921d2d18e3082cd04520e22e2b04127
GitHub-Last-Rev: c0999b83439a5f0ff57b740c18f47d81028e552a
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#207
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/390414
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If we are going to send the disconnect message and close the connection,
because we have exhausted the number of authentication attempts, don't
send the final authentication failure message. This behavior matches
that of OpenSSH.
Fixes golang/go#51149
Change-Id: I43b2de2e854f789161cd7fd6c05876661adfb2c1
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Fixes golang/go#50805
Change-Id: Icdd2835b1626240faf61936288f279570c873158
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Change-Id: I2287ab3492c105791b03f40d45b5dff5a56aa32a
GitHub-Last-Rev: 02cdf82d8b1604fc47b656172b102a48a70e6f05
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#183
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Use a net.Pipe, rather than setting up a local TCP connection,
for testing malformed SSH requests, since we don't need the
complex intricacies of a real connection to test this protocol
behavior.
Fixes golang/go#50161
Change-Id: I5e46c42041ddd03b06725469216b82b801990e64
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When reading GCM and ChaChaPoly1305 packets, don't make assumptions
about the size of the enciphered plaintext. This fixes two panics
caused by standards non-compliant malformed packets.
Thanks to Rod Hynes, Psiphon Inc. for reporting this issue.
Fixes golang/go#49932
Fixes CVE-2021-43565
Change-Id: I660cff39d197e0d04ec44d11d792b22d954df2ef
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This change adds support for RSA SHA-2 based signatures for host keys and certificates. It also switches the default certificate signature algorithm for RSA to use SHA-512. This is implemented by treating ssh.Signer specially when the key type is `ssh-rsa` by also allowing SHA-256 and SHA-512 signatures.
Fixes golang/go#37278
Change-Id: I2ee1ac4ae4c9c1de441a2d6cf1e806357ef18910
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Fixes golang/go#36646
Change-Id: Ic19dd2171c84472fc9d3f44803224b87fc5c0417
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Fix golang/go#45249
Change-Id: I27ef2976586ad481d832c6e46695a91f1bb50373
GitHub-Last-Rev: 9f631b80925719a0fb77576f7983cd7c8d0b5056
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#180
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