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2023-11-23ssh: fix certificate authentication with OpenSSH 7.2-7.7Nicola Murino
OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 advertises support for rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 in the "server-sig-algs" extension but doesn't support these algorithms for certificate authentication, so if the server rejects the key try to use the obtained algorithm as if "server-sig-algs" had not been implemented. Fixes golang/go#58371 Change-Id: Id49960d3dedd32a21e2c6c2689b1696e05398286 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/510155 Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> Auto-Submit: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
2023-11-08ssh: allow to configure public key auth algorithms on the server sidev0.15.0Nicola Murino
Fixes golang/go#61244 Change-Id: I29b43e379cf0cdb07b0d6935666491b997157e73 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/510775 TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Bryan Mills <bcmills@google.com> Commit-Queue: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com> Run-TryBot: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com> Auto-Submit: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
2023-07-31ssh: add diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 kexNicola Murino
This group is disabled by default because it is a bit slower than the others. The group18-sha512 variant is too slow to include. Benchstat results including diffie-hellman-group18-sha512: name time/op Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256-12 22.6ms ± 9% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group18-sha512-12 1.15s ±11% Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp384-12 3.91ms ± 6% Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp256-12 304µs ± 5% Kexes/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org-12 413µs ± 7% Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp521-12 11.6ms ±13% Kexes/curve25519-sha256-12 361µs ± 5% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1-12 22.9ms ± 9% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group1-sha1-12 3.59ms ± 6% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha1-12 22.1ms ±11% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha256-12 21.6ms ± 8% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group16-sha512-12 138ms ± 9% name alloc/op Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256-12 67.8kB ± 1% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group18-sha512-12 243kB ± 9% Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp384-12 13.9kB ± 0% Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp256-12 12.1kB ± 0% Kexes/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org-12 8.22kB ± 0% Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp521-12 16.5kB ± 0% Kexes/curve25519-sha256-12 8.22kB ± 0% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1-12 67.5kB ± 0% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group1-sha1-12 34.9kB ± 0% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha1-12 61.9kB ± 0% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha256-12 62.0kB ± 0% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group16-sha512-12 117kB ± 0% name allocs/op Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256-12 314 ± 0% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group18-sha512-12 271 ± 4% Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp384-12 243 ± 0% Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp256-12 213 ± 0% Kexes/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org-12 168 ± 0% Kexes/ecdh-sha2-nistp521-12 245 ± 0% Kexes/curve25519-sha256-12 168 ± 0% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1-12 314 ± 0% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group1-sha1-12 255 ± 0% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha1-12 255 ± 0% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group14-sha256-12 255 ± 0% Kexes/diffie-hellman-group16-sha512-12 256 ± 0% Change-Id: Id119401fda7e417675325f37e3d442e70585206c Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/506839 Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com> Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com> Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2023-07-31ssh: ignore invalid MACs and KEXs just like we do for ciphersNicola Murino
Tighter validation could cause backwards incompatibility issues, eg configurations with valid and invalid MACs, KEXs, ciphers currently work if a supported algorithm is negotiated and that's also the scenario of removing support for an existing algorithm. Fixes golang/go#39397 Change-Id: If90253ba89e1d8f732cc1e1c3d24fe0a1e2dac71 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/512175 Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
2023-07-14ssh: prefer sha256 based RSA key algorithmsNicola Murino
sha256 is more optimized than sha512 in Go and is secure enough so prefer sha256 over sha512. Change-Id: I3fcf7457791e3ef4539e97049aa905dcd293499d Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/507556 Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com> Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2023-07-10ssh: fix RSA certificate and public key authentication with older clientsNicola Murino
After adding support for rsa-sha2-256/512 on the server side some edge cases started to arise with old clients: 1) public key authentication with gpg-agent < 2.2.6 fails because we receive ssh-rsa as signature format and rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 as algorithm. This is a bug in gpg-agent fixed in this commit: https://github.com/gpg/gnupg/commit/80b775bdbb852aa4a80292c9357e5b1876110c00 2) certificate authentication fails with OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 because we receive ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com as algorithm and rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 as signature format. This patch is based on CL 412854 and has been tested with every version of OpenSSH from 7.1 to 7.9 and OpenSSH 9.3. Fixes golang/go#53391 Change-Id: Id71f596f73d84efb5c76d6d5388432cccad3e3b1 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/506835 Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2023-07-05ssh: prefer sha256 based MAC algorithmsNicola Murino
sha256 is more optimized than sha512 in Go and is secure enough so prefer sha256 over sha512. Fixes golang/go#61138 Change-Id: I7658808655367f1ab5f4ac8b52e6b20bd30ebf87 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/507555 Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Joedian Reid <joedian@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
2023-06-22ssh: add hmac-sha2-512Stan Hu
This adds support for hmac-sha2-512 to ensure compatibility with SSH clients that request this MAC algorithm. This rebases https://github.com/golang/crypto/pull/18. Change-Id: Ia103c10a8b7e2e8dde556d5c36550eb5fa6bc1f6 GitHub-Last-Rev: 987ccae2bc7ae5e90a482d8797351c39dcb9bf33 GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#257 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/501455 Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com> Commit-Queue: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Auto-Submit: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com> Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
2023-06-05Add support for "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"Stefan Klein
Change-Id: I0203881afd7ad72e68f76650817451d7e292c91b GitHub-Last-Rev: 42b4119e1987e7a46aa06a2b142d5fd3ef6f216a GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#129 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/226982 Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Auto-Submit: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
2023-02-15ssh: add support for aes256-gcm@openssh.comNicola Murino
Change-Id: I91caf3bda3dfd00c050f5ebf23c2a35a04c5762b GitHub-Last-Rev: 6e71340e7960b5b6f71f7b96eeeaf8dfb268e306 GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#127 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/223518 Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
2022-11-12ssh: support rsa-sha2-256/512 on the server sideFilippo Valsorda
This lets clients know we support rsa-sha2-256/512 signatures from ssh-rsa public keys. OpenSSH prefers to break the connection rather than attempting trial and error, apparently. We don't enable support for the "ext-info-s" because we're not interested in any client->server extensions. This also replaces isAcceptableAlgo which was rejecting the rsa-sha2-256/512-cert-v01@openssh.com public key algorithms. Tested with OpenSSH 9.1 on macOS Ventura. Fixes golang/go#49269 Updates golang/go#49952 Co-authored-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Kristin Davidson <kdavidson@atlassian.com> Change-Id: I4955c3b12bb45575e9977ac657bb5805b49d00c3 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/447757 Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
2022-10-12all: use automatic RFC linkingAxel Wagner
pkgsite automatically links /RFC \d+/ to the mentioned RFC. Insert a bunch of spaces into doc-comments for that to match. Change-Id: I01834d7573428563f21c37e43316442e148dd8c4 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/442055 Reviewed-by: Joedian Reid <joedian@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com> Auto-Submit: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
2022-03-14ssh: support rsa-sha2-256/512 for client authenticationFilippo Valsorda
CL 220037 had implemented support for host authentication using rsa-sha2-256/512, but not client public key authentication. OpenSSH disabled the SHA-1 based ssh-rsa by default in version 8.8 (after pre-announcing it in versions 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7) although some distributions re-enable it. GitHub will start rejecting ssh-rsa for keys uploaded before November 2, 2021 on March 15, 2022. https://github.blog/2021-09-01-improving-git-protocol-security-github/ The server side already worked, as long as the client selected one of the SHA-2 algorithms, because the signature flowed freely to Verify. There was however nothing verifying that the signature algorithm matched the advertised one. The comment suggested the check was being performed, but it got lost back in CL 86190043. Not a security issue because the signature had to pass the callback's Verify method regardless, and both values were checked to be acceptable. Tested with OpenSSH 8.8 configured with "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes -ssh-rsa" and no application-side changes. The Signers returned by ssh/agent (when backed by an agent client) didn't actually implement AlgorithmSigner but ParameterizedSigner, an interface defined in an earlier version of CL 123955. Updates golang/go#49269 Fixes golang/go#39885 For golang/go#49952 Change-Id: I13b41db8041f1112a70f106c55f077b904b12cb8 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/392394 Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2022-03-14ssh: don't advertise rsa-sha2 algorithms if we can't use themFilippo Valsorda
The server implementation looks at the HostKeys to advertise and negotiate host key signature algorithms. A fundamental issue of the Signer and AlgorithmSigner interfaces is that they don't expose the supported signature algorithms, so really the server has to guess. Currently, it would guess exclusively based on the PublicKey.Type, regardless of whether the host key implemented AlgorithmSigner. This means that a legacy Signer that only supports ssh-rsa still led the server to negotiate rsa-sha2 algorithms. The server would then fail to find a suitable host key to make the signature and crash. This won't happen if only Signers from this package are used, but if a custom Signer that doesn't support SignWithAlgorithm() but returns "ssh-rsa" from PublicKey().Type() is used as a HostKey, the server is vulnerable to DoS. The only workable rules to determine what to advertise seems to be: 1. a pure Signer will always Sign with the PublicKey.Type 2. an AlgorithmSigner supports all algorithms associated with the PublicKey.Type Rule number two means that we can't add new supported algorithms in the future, which is not great, but it's too late to fix that. rsaSigner was breaking rule number one, and although it would have been fine where it's used, I didn't want to break our own interface contract. It's unclear why we had separate test key entries for rsa-sha2 algorithms, since we can use the ssh-rsa key for those. The only test that used them, TestCertTypes, seemed broken: the init was actually failing at making the corresponding signers rsaSigners, and indeed the test for the SHA-256 signer expected and checked a SHA-512 signature. Pending CVE For golang/go#49952 Change-Id: Ie658eefcadd87906e63fc7faae8249376aa96c79 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/392355 Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
2022-03-14ssh: deprecate and replace SigAlgo constantsFilippo Valsorda
RFC 8332, Section 2 sets up two overlapping namespaces: public key formats and public key algorithms. * The formats are what we currently have KeyAlgo constants for, and they appear in PublicKey.Type. * The algorithms are the set of both KeyAlgo and SigAlgo constants, and they appear in Signature.Format (amongst other places). This is incoherent, because that means Signature.Format can be both a KeyAlgo (like KeyAlgoECDSA256) or a SigAlgo (like SigAlgoRSASHA2256). One solution would be to duplicate all the KeyAlgo constants into the SigAlgo namespace, but that would be confusing because applications are currently using KeyAlgos where they'd be supposed to use the new SigAlgos (while we can't deprecate the KeyAlgos because they are still necessary for the PublicKey.Type namespace). Instead, drop the separate namespaces, and use KeyAlgos throughout. There are simply some KeyAlgos that can't be a PublicKey.Type. Take the opportunity to fix the stuttering SHA22565/SHA2512 names. It's totally ok to call those hashes SHA-256 and SHA-512 without the family infix. For golang/go#49952 Change-Id: Ia1fce3912a7e60aa70a88f75ed311be331fd19d5 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/392354 Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
2022-03-14ssh: add diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 kexFilippo Valsorda
RFC 9142 made diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 from RFC 8268 a MUST, and it's strictly better than diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, which we already have, and trivial to add. > The method of key exchange used for the name "diffie-hellman- > group14-sha256" is the same as that for "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" > except that the SHA256 hash algorithm is used. Ignore the bigger groups which have a meaningful performance cost, and don't share the same interoperability benefit. Adapted from CL 387994. Fixes golang/go#31731 Co-authored-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com> Change-Id: Id4ce345a2065840f193986739ea890f105a1e929 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/392014 Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2022-03-14ssh: support new curve25519-sha256 kex nameМихаил Патин
RFC 8731 standardized curve25519-sha256@libssh.org as curve25519-sha256, and some systems only advertise support for the new name. Fixes golang/go#48756 Change-Id: Ice35874cd8c07ad48752686ac368bf11ab793f77 Co-authored-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/385394 Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Trust: Matt Layher <mdlayher@gmail.com> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2022-03-12ssh: ignore MAC if AEAD ciphers negotiatedRoland Shoemaker
If the server/client cipher chosen is one of the two AEAD ciphers that we support (aes128-gcm@openssh.com and chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com), don't attempt to find a common MAC algorithm in findAgreedAlgorithms. Similarly in newPacketCipher, don't attempt to generate a MAC key if we are using a AEAD cipher. Fixes golang/go#51406 Change-Id: Id48ae72f052cb0a0c597b32e9901a0f218e4161f Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/389214 Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2021-11-15ssh: support RSA SHA-2 (RFC8332) signaturesHans Nielsen
This change adds support for RSA SHA-2 based signatures for host keys and certificates. It also switches the default certificate signature algorithm for RSA to use SHA-512. This is implemented by treating ssh.Signer specially when the key type is `ssh-rsa` by also allowing SHA-256 and SHA-512 signatures. Fixes golang/go#37278 Change-Id: I2ee1ac4ae4c9c1de441a2d6cf1e806357ef18910 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/220037 Trust: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Run-TryBot: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2019-09-09ssh: drop dh-group1-sha1 from default key exchangesEric Brown
This removes diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 from the list of default key exchange algorithms. This kex is considered weak and potentially vulnerable to the Logjam attack. Note: This is a backwards incompatible change: if you connect to ssh servers that do not support any key exchanges except for dh-group1-sha1, you must now specify config.KeyExchanges explicity. See also: https://www.openssh.com/legacy.html https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2015/8/3/ssh-weak-diffie-hellman-group-identification-tool.html Fixes golang/go#12955 Change-Id: I032d5175d63ab5d1912de72957a80200eb396bc9 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/123595 Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
2019-06-17ssh: add diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256Lucas Bremgartner
Add the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 defined in RFC 4419 to the list of supported key exchange algorithms for ssh. The server half is only a minimal implementation to satisfy the automated tests. Fixes golang/go#17230 Change-Id: I25880a564347fd9b4738dd2ed1e347cd5d2e21bb GitHub-Last-Rev: 9f0b8d02c0c96e9baf00cdf1cf063ff834245443 GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#87 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/174257 Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
2019-04-18ssh: invert algorithm choices on the serverHan-Wen Nienhuys
At the protocol level, SSH lets client and server specify different algorithms for the read and write half of the connection. This has never worked correctly, as Client-to-Server was always interpreted as the "write" side, even if we were the server. This has never been a problem because, apparently, there are no clients that insist on different algorithm choices running against Go SSH servers. Since the SSH package does not expose a mechanism to specify algorithms for read/write separately, there is end-to-end for this change, so add a unittest instead. Change-Id: Ie3aa781630a3bb7a3b0e3754cb67b3ce12581544 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/172538 Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2018-01-22ssh: use io.ReadFull() for reading chacha20-poly1305 packets.Han-Wen Nienhuys
Incomplete reads leave (part of) the verification tag zeroed, leading to a failing MAC, and this is more likely to happen with larger packets. The test added in the previous commit should stop this from regressing. Reinstate chacha20-poly1305 as a default cipher and prefer it over AES CTR flavors. Fixes golang/go#23510 Change-Id: I7599897e59448edb7b814eebcc8226ea15b365d6 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/89075 Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2018-01-22ssh: remove chacha20-poly1305 from preferredCipher listHan-Wen Nienhuys
This effectively disables the cipher. Add a test against OpenSSH which sends larger packets through the tested ciphers. This reproduces the problem reported in golang/go#23510 Change-Id: I4b124c690c409c6a0af2621e58a964ff55815f57 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/88995 Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2018-01-22ssh: remove arcfour ciphers from the default preference listHan-Wen Nienhuys
OpenSSH removed these ciphers from sshd's default configuration with release 6.7 in 2014. Change-Id: Ia8b6d671dc8fa5d0493bf933d3b541f8ae5707a3 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/86955 Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
2018-01-19ssh: support chacha20-poly1305 cipherHan-Wen Nienhuys
chacha20-poly1305 is an AEAD which performs well without hardware support. It is recommended as a replacement for the aging arcfour128 and arcfour256 ciphers. Fixes golang/go#9489 Change-Id: I5d5a4620a435e65997f0ba7e683a34c29d9a396b Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/87077 Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
2017-11-28all: fix errors reported by vet, golintKevin Burke
None are "wrong" per se, but there are a lot of good suggestions and in one case a docstring that was not present in godoc due to the presence of an extra newline. Changed "Id" in struct properties to "ID" in some non-exported structs. Removed a trailing period from some error messages; I believe the exact contents of error strings are not covered by the Go compatibility promise. Change-Id: I7c620582dc247396f72c52d38c909ccc0ec87b83 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/80145 Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
2017-04-04ssh: reject RekeyThresholds over MaxInt64Han-Wen Nienhuys
This fixes weirdness when users use int64(-1) as sentinel value. Also, really use cipher specific default thresholds. These were added in a59c127441a8ae2ad9b0fb300ab36a6558bba697, but weren't taking effect. Add a test. Fixes golang/go#19639 Change-Id: Ie9518a0ff12fded2fca35465abb427d7a9f84340 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/39431 Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
2017-03-30ssh: fix typo in unexported commentBrad Fitzpatrick
Thanks to Anisse Astier (@anisse) for noticing. Change-Id: I1c282b2bb54601cf5649e194eafd5344c70331ca Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/38916 Reviewed-by: dnv aps Sn <sndnvaps@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
2017-02-08ssh: Add the hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com algorithmMiLk
Fixes golang/go#17676 Change-Id: I96c51431b174898a6bc0f6bec7f4561d5d64819f Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/35513 Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2017-01-30ssh: rationalize rekeying decisions.Han-Wen Nienhuys
1) Always force a key exchange if we exchange 2^31 packets. In the past this might not happen if RekeyThreshold was set to a very large interval. 2) Follow recommendations from RFC 4344 for block ciphers. For AES, we can encrypt 2^(blocksize/4) blocks under the same keys. On modern hardware, the previous default of 1Gb could force a key exchange within ~10 seconds. Since the key exchange takes 3 roundtrips (send kex init, send DH init, send NEW_KEYS), this is relatively expensive on high-latency links. Change-Id: I1297124a307c541b7bf22d814d136ec0c6d8ed97 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/35410 Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2016-07-14x/crypto/ssh: add ed25519 certs to supportedHostKeyAlgosPeter Moody
Change-Id: I46bb7721c081b8a9b0395a4f7c49b7f3e27bbc49 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/24831 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2016-05-12x/crypto/ssh: add support for ed25519 keysMartin Garton
Added support for parsing the "new" openssh private key format. (ed25519 keys only in this format for now) Signing and verifying functions now work with ed25519 keys. ed25519 can now be accepted by the server to authenticate a client. ed25519 can now be accepted by a client as a server host key. Related documentation used: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bjh21-ssh-ed25519-02.txt Change-Id: I84385f24d666fea08de21f980f78623f7bff8007 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/22512 Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
2015-08-29crypto/ssh: clearer error messages when "no ciphers in common"Thomas Desrosiers
The error message reported by the ssh client when it can't find a "cipher" in common between the client and server was overly vague. This adds more detailed error messages to findAgreedAlgorithms so that the user can more easily identify which of the components can't reach agreement. Change-Id: I4d985e92fea964793213e5600b52b3141e712000 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/13817 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-08-17x/crypto/ssh: implement curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key agreement.hanwen
Fixes golang/go#11004. Change-Id: Ic37cf9d620e3397b7ad769ae16abdaee63a7733b Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/13592 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-05-14ssh: add hmac-sha2-256.datianshi
Fixes golang/go#10274 Change-Id: Id8386828ee92ccc6cba5197831cdb8b2ce0cd648 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/8353 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org> Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-04-10crypto/ssh: add support for aes128-cbc cipher.Nathan(yinian) Hu
The aes128cbc cipher is commented out in cipher.go on purpose, anyone wants to use the cipher needs to uncomment line 119 in cipher.go Fixes #4274. Change-Id: I4bbc88ab884bda821c5f155dcf495bb7235c8605 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/8396 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2014-04-09go.crypto/ssh: import gosshnew.Adam Langley
See https://groups.google.com/d/msg/Golang-nuts/AoVxQ4bB5XQ/i8kpMxdbVlEJ R=hanwen CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/86190043
2013-10-10go.crypto/ssh: cosmetic only spelling fixesJonathan Pittman
R=agl, hanwen CC=dave, golang-dev, jpsugar https://golang.org/cl/14430055
2013-10-09go.crypto/ssh: fix certificate parsing/marshaling.JP Sugarbroad
The change to add the PublicKey interface accidentally caused certificate handling to expect an extra copy of the private key algorithm name in the binary representation. This change adapts a suitable parsing API and adds a test to ensure that cert handling isn't easily broken in the future. R=agl, hanwen, jmpittman CC=golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/13272055
2013-10-08go.crypto/ssh: move interpretation of msgNewKeys intoHan-Wen Nienhuys
transport. Sending the msgNewKeys packet and setting up the key material now happen under a lock, preventing races with concurrent writers. R=kardianos, agl, jpsugar, hanwenn CC=golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/14476043
2013-10-07go.crypto/ssh: let client accept DSA and ECDSA host key algorithms.Han-Wen Nienhuys
R=agl, dave, jpsugar, m4dh4tt3r, agl CC=golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/14420045
2013-09-24go.crypto/ssh: separate kex algorithms into kexAlgorithm class.Han-Wen Nienhuys
Adds readPacket() to conn, and renames conn to packetConn. Key exchanges operate on packetConn, so they can be unittested. R=agl, jpsugar, dave CC=golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/13352055
2013-09-19go.crypto/ssh: introduce Signer method, an abstraction ofHan-Wen Nienhuys
private keys. R=agl, jpsugar, jonathan.mark.pittman CC=golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/13338044
2013-09-13go.crypto/ssh: introduce PublicKey interface type.Han-Wen Nienhuys
Public functions affected: -AgentKey.Key -AgentClient.SignRequest -ClientKeyring.Key -MarshalPublicKey -ParsePublicKey R=agl, jpsugar, jmpittman CC=golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/13642043
2013-09-09go.crypto/ssh: Begin adding server side support for more than RSA for client ↵Jonathan Pittman
key auth R=agl, dave, hanwen CC=ekg, golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/13528044
2013-09-05go.crypto/ssh: remove misleading marshalPrivRSA.Han-Wen Nienhuys
Properly capitalize publicKey throughout. R=golang-dev CC=agl, dave, golang-dev, jpsugar https://golang.org/cl/13415046
2013-08-28go.crypto/ssh: implement ECDH.Han-Wen Nienhuys
Implement elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman, including host key signature verification. Moves host key cryptographic verification to ClientConn.handshake(), so RSA host keys are also verified. Fixes golang/go#6158. R=dave, agl CC=golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/13021045
2013-06-06go.crypto/ssh: implement keyboard-interactive auth (RFC 4256), bothHan-Wen Nienhuys
on client and server-side. R=dave, agl CC=gobot, golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/9853050
2012-12-16go.crypto/ssh: some cleanupJonathan Pittman
Simplify MarshalAuthorizedKey by using the algoName func. Make the algoName func be very specific about supported key types in openssh certs. Generalize some of the commentary that previously mentioned specific key types. R=agl, dave CC=golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/6938067
generated by cgit v1.3 (git 2.53.0) at 2026-04-15 05:05:59 +0000