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2022-10-06Sync with 2.36.3Taylor Blau
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-06t7527: prepare for changing protocol.file.allowTaylor Blau
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t7527 in preparation for merging a security release which will change the default value of this configuration to be "user". Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-06Sync with 2.35.5Taylor Blau
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-06Sync with 2.34.5Taylor Blau
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-06Sync with 2.33.5Taylor Blau
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-06Sync with 2.32.4Taylor Blau
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-06Sync with 2.31.5Taylor Blau
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-06Sync with 2.30.6Taylor Blau
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-05t5537: prepare for changing protocol.file.allowTaylor Blau
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t5537 in preparation for merging a security release which will change the default value of this configuration to be "user". Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-05t3206: prepare for changing protocol.file.allowTaylor Blau
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t3206 in preparation for merging a security release which will change the default value of this configuration to be "user". Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t7814: prepare for changing protocol.file.allowTaylor Blau
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t7814 in preparation for merging a security release which will change the default value of this configuration to be "user". Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t5537: prepare for changing protocol.file.allowTaylor Blau
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t5537 in preparation for merging a security release which will change the default value of this configuration to be "user". Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t5516: prepare for changing protocol.file.allowTaylor Blau
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t5516 in preparation for merging a security release which will change the default value of this configuration to be "user". Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t3207: prepare for changing protocol.file.allowTaylor Blau
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t3207 in preparation for merging a security release which will change the default value of this configuration to be "user". Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t2080: prepare for changing protocol.file.allowTaylor Blau
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation for merging a security release which will change the default value of this configuration to be "user". Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t1092: prepare for changing protocol.file.allowTaylor Blau
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation for merging a security release which will change the default value of this configuration to be "user". Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t2080: prepare for changing protocol.file.allowTaylor Blau
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation for merging a security release which will change the default value of this configuration to be "user". Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t1092: prepare for changing protocol.file.allowTaylor Blau
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation for merging a security release which will change the default value of this configuration to be "user". Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01shell: limit size of interactive commandsJeff King
When git-shell is run in interactive mode (which must be enabled by creating $HOME/git-shell-commands), it reads commands from stdin, one per line, and executes them. We read the commands with git_read_line_interactively(), which uses a strbuf under the hood. That means we'll accept an input of arbitrary size (limited only by how much heap we can allocate). That creates two problems: - the rest of the code is not prepared to handle large inputs. The most serious issue here is that split_cmdline() uses "int" for most of its types, which can lead to integer overflow and out-of-bounds array reads and writes. But even with that fixed, we assume that we can feed the command name to snprintf() (via xstrfmt()), which is stuck for historical reasons using "int", and causes it to fail (and even trigger a BUG() call). - since the point of git-shell is to take input from untrusted or semi-trusted clients, it's a mild denial-of-service. We'll allocate as many bytes as the client sends us (actually twice as many, since we immediately duplicate the buffer). We can fix both by just limiting the amount of per-command input we're willing to receive. We should also fix split_cmdline(), of course, which is an accident waiting to happen, but that can come on top. Most calls to split_cmdline(), including the other one in git-shell, are OK because they are reading from an OS-provided argv, which is limited in practice. This patch should eliminate the immediate vulnerabilities. I picked 4MB as an arbitrary limit. It's big enough that nobody should ever run into it in practice (since the point is to run the commands via exec, we're subject to OS limits which are typically much lower). But it's small enough that allocating it isn't that big a deal. The code is mostly just swapping out fgets() for the strbuf call, but we have to add a few niceties like flushing and trimming line endings. We could simplify things further by putting the buffer on the stack, but 4MB is probably a bit much there. Note that we'll _always_ allocate 4MB, which for normal, non-malicious requests is more than we would before this patch. But on the other hand, other git programs are happy to use 96MB for a delta cache. And since we'd never touch most of those pages, on a lazy-allocating OS like Linux they won't even get allocated to actual RAM. The ideal would be a version of strbuf_getline() that accepted a maximum value. But for a minimal vulnerability fix, let's keep things localized and simple. We can always refactor further on top. The included test fails in an obvious way with ASan or UBSan (which notice the integer overflow and out-of-bounds reads). Without them, it fails in a less obvious way: we may segfault, or we may try to xstrfmt() a long string, leading to a BUG(). Either way, it fails reliably before this patch, and passes with it. Note that we don't need an EXPENSIVE prereq on it. It does take 10-15s to fail before this patch, but with the new limit, we fail almost immediately (and the perl process generating 2GB of data exits via SIGPIPE). Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01shell: add basic testsJeff King
We have no tests of even basic functionality of git-shell. Let's add a couple of obvious ones. This will serve as a framework for adding tests for new things we fix, as well as making sure we don't screw anything up too badly while doing so. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t/t9NNN: allow local submodulesTaylor Blau
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to "user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them over the file protocol. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of times use `test_config_global`. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t/t7NNN: allow local submodulesTaylor Blau
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to "user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them over the file protocol. Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test towards the beginning of the script. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t/t6NNN: allow local submodulesTaylor Blau
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to "user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them over the file protocol. Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate configuration via `-c`. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t/t5NNN: allow local submodulesTaylor Blau
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to "user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them over the file protocol. Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test towards the beginning of the script. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t/t4NNN: allow local submodulesTaylor Blau
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to "user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them over the file protocol. Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test towards the beginning of the script. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t/t3NNN: allow local submodulesTaylor Blau
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to "user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them over the file protocol. Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test towards the beginning of the script. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t/2NNNN: allow local submodulesTaylor Blau
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to "user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them over the file protocol. Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test towards the beginning of the script. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t/t1NNN: allow local submodulesTaylor Blau
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to "user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them over the file protocol. Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of times use `test_config_global` instead. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodulesTaylor Blau
To prepare for changing the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to "user", update the `prolog()` function in lib-submodule-update to allow submodules to be cloned over the file protocol. This is used by a handful of submodule-related test scripts, which themselves will have to tweak the value of `protocol.file.allow` in certain locations. Those will be done in subsequent commits. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinksTaylor Blau
When cloning a repository with `--local`, Git relies on either making a hardlink or copy to every file in the "objects" directory of the source repository. This is done through the callpath `cmd_clone()` -> `clone_local()` -> `copy_or_link_directory()`. The way this optimization works is by enumerating every file and directory recursively in the source repository's `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory, and then either making a copy or hardlink of each file. The only exception to this rule is when copying the "alternates" file, in which case paths are rewritten to be absolute before writing a new "alternates" file in the destination repo. One quirk of this implementation is that it dereferences symlinks when cloning. This behavior was most recently modified in 36596fd2df (clone: better handle symlinked files at .git/objects/, 2019-07-10), which attempted to support `--local` clones of repositories with symlinks in their objects directory in a platform-independent way. Unfortunately, this behavior of dereferencing symlinks (that is, creating a hardlink or copy of the source's link target in the destination repository) can be used as a component in attacking a victim by inadvertently exposing the contents of file stored outside of the repository. Take, for example, a repository that stores a Dockerfile and is used to build Docker images. When building an image, Docker copies the directory contents into the VM, and then instructs the VM to execute the Dockerfile at the root of the copied directory. This protects against directory traversal attacks by copying symbolic links as-is without dereferencing them. That is, if a user has a symlink pointing at their private key material (where the symlink is present in the same directory as the Dockerfile, but the key itself is present outside of that directory), the key is unreadable to a Docker image, since the link will appear broken from the container's point of view. This behavior enables an attack whereby a victim is convinced to clone a repository containing an embedded submodule (with a URL like "file:///proc/self/cwd/path/to/submodule") which has a symlink pointing at a path containing sensitive information on the victim's machine. If a user is tricked into doing this, the contents at the destination of those symbolic links are exposed to the Docker image at runtime. One approach to preventing this behavior is to recreate symlinks in the destination repository. But this is problematic, since symlinking the objects directory are not well-supported. (One potential problem is that when sharing, e.g. a "pack" directory via symlinks, different writers performing garbage collection may consider different sets of objects to be reachable, enabling a situation whereby garbage collecting one repository may remove reachable objects in another repository). Instead, prohibit the local clone optimization when any symlinks are present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory of the source repository. Users may clone the repository again by prepending the "file://" scheme to their clone URL, or by adding the `--no-local` option to their `git clone` invocation. The directory iterator used by `copy_or_link_directory()` must no longer dereference symlinks (i.e., it *must* call `lstat()` instead of `stat()` in order to discover whether or not there are symlinks present). This has no bearing on the overall behavior, since we will immediately `die()` on encounter a symlink. Note that t5604.33 suggests that we do support local clones with symbolic links in the source repository's objects directory, but this was likely unintentional, or at least did not take into consideration the problem with sharing parts of the objects directory with symbolic links at the time. Update this test to reflect which options are and aren't supported. Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-09-13Merge branch 'en/merge-unstash-only-on-clean-merge' into maintJunio C Hamano
The auto-stashed local changes created by "git merge --autostash" was mixed into a conflicted state left in the working tree, which has been corrected. * en/merge-unstash-only-on-clean-merge: merge: only apply autostash when appropriate
2022-09-13Merge branch 'jk/pipe-command-nonblock' into maintJunio C Hamano
Fix deadlocks between main Git process and subprocess spawned via the pipe_command() API, that can kill "git add -p" that was reimplemented in C recently. * jk/pipe-command-nonblock: pipe_command(): mark stdin descriptor as non-blocking pipe_command(): handle ENOSPC when writing to a pipe pipe_command(): avoid xwrite() for writing to pipe git-compat-util: make MAX_IO_SIZE define globally available nonblock: support Windows compat: add function to enable nonblocking pipes
2022-09-13Merge branch 'jk/is-promisor-object-keep-tree-in-use' into maintJunio C Hamano
An earlier optimization discarded a tree-object buffer that is still in use, which has been corrected. * jk/is-promisor-object-keep-tree-in-use: is_promisor_object(): fix use-after-free of tree buffer
2022-08-26Merge branch 'vd/sparse-reset-checkout-fixes' into maintJunio C Hamano
Fixes to sparse index compatibility work for "reset" and "checkout" commands. source: <pull.1312.v3.git.1659985672.gitgitgadget@gmail.com> * vd/sparse-reset-checkout-fixes: unpack-trees: unpack new trees as sparse directories cache.h: create 'index_name_pos_sparse()' oneway_diff: handle removed sparse directories checkout: fix nested sparse directory diff in sparse index
2022-08-26Merge branch 'jk/fsck-tree-mode-bits-fix' into maintJunio C Hamano
"git fsck" reads mode from tree objects but canonicalizes the mode before passing it to the logic to check object sanity, which has hid broken tree objects from the checking logic. This has been corrected, but to help exiting projects with broken tree objects that they cannot fix retroactively, the severity of anomalies this code detects has been demoted to "info" for now. source: <YvQcNpizy9uOZiAz@coredump.intra.peff.net> * jk/fsck-tree-mode-bits-fix: fsck: downgrade tree badFilemode to "info" fsck: actually detect bad file modes in trees tree-walk: add a mechanism for getting non-canonicalized modes
2022-08-26Merge branch 'pw/use-glibc-tunable-for-malloc-optim' into maintJunio C Hamano
Avoid repeatedly running getconf to ask libc version in the test suite, and instead just as it once per script. source: <pull.1311.git.1659620305757.gitgitgadget@gmail.com> * pw/use-glibc-tunable-for-malloc-optim: tests: cache glibc version check
2022-08-26Merge branch 'ab/hooks-regression-fix' into maintJunio C Hamano
A follow-up fix to a fix for a regression in 2.36. source: <patch-1.1-2450e3e65cf-20220805T141402Z-avarab@gmail.com> * ab/hooks-regression-fix: hook API: don't segfault on strbuf_addf() to NULL "out"
2022-08-24merge: only apply autostash when appropriateElijah Newren
If a merge failed and we are leaving conflicts in the working directory for the user to resolve, we should not attempt to apply any autostash. Further, if we fail to apply the autostash (because either the merge failed, or the user requested --no-commit), then we should instruct the user how to apply it later. Add a testcase verifying we have corrected this behavior. Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2022-08-17pipe_command(): mark stdin descriptor as non-blockingJeff King
Our pipe_command() helper lets you both write to and read from a child process on its stdin/stdout. It's supposed to work without deadlocks because we use poll() to check when descriptors are ready for reading or writing. But there's a bug: if both the data to be written and the data to be read back exceed the pipe buffer, we'll deadlock. The issue is that the code assumes that if you have, say, a 2MB buffer to write and poll() tells you that the pipe descriptor is ready for writing, that calling: write(cmd->in, buf, 2*1024*1024); will do a partial write, filling the pipe buffer and then returning what it did write. And that is what it would do on a socket, but not for a pipe. When writing to a pipe, at least on Linux, it will block waiting for the child process to read() more. And now we have a potential deadlock, because the child may be writing back to us, waiting for us to read() ourselves. An easy way to trigger this is: git -c add.interactive.useBuiltin=true \ -c interactive.diffFilter=cat \ checkout -p HEAD~200 The diff against HEAD~200 will be big, and the filter wants to write all of it back to us (obviously this is a dummy filter, but in the real world something like diff-highlight would similarly stream back a big output). If you set add.interactive.useBuiltin to false, the problem goes away, because now we're not using pipe_command() anymore (instead, that part happens in perl). But this isn't a bug in the interactive code at all. It's the underlying pipe_command() code which is broken, and has been all along. We presumably didn't notice because most calls only do input _or_ output, not both. And the few that do both, like gpg calls, may have large inputs or outputs, but never both at the same time (e.g., consider signing, which has a large payload but a small signature comes back). The obvious fix is to put the descriptor into non-blocking mode, and indeed, that makes the problem go away. Callers shouldn't need to care, because they never see the descriptor (they hand us a buffer to feed into it). The included test fails reliably on Linux without this patch. Curiously, it doesn't fail in our Windows CI environment, but has been reported to do so for individual developers. It should pass in any environment after this patch (courtesy of the compat/ layers added in the last few commits). Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2022-08-14is_promisor_object(): fix use-after-free of tree bufferJeff King
Since commit fcc07e980b (is_promisor_object(): free tree buffer after parsing, 2021-04-13), we'll always free the buffers attached to a "struct tree" after searching them for promisor links. But there's an important case where we don't want to do so: if somebody else is already using the tree! This can happen during a "rev-list --missing=allow-promisor" traversal in a partial clone that is missing one or more trees or blobs. The backtrace for the free looks like this: #1 free_tree_buffer tree.c:147 #2 add_promisor_object packfile.c:2250 #3 for_each_object_in_pack packfile.c:2190 #4 for_each_packed_object packfile.c:2215 #5 is_promisor_object packfile.c:2272 #6 finish_object__ma builtin/rev-list.c:245 #7 finish_object builtin/rev-list.c:261 #8 show_object builtin/rev-list.c:274 #9 process_blob list-objects.c:63 #10 process_tree_contents list-objects.c:145 #11 process_tree list-objects.c:201 #12 traverse_trees_and_blobs list-objects.c:344 [...] We're in the middle of walking through the entries of a tree object via process_tree_contents(). We see a blob (or it could even be another tree entry) that we don't have, so we call is_promisor_object() to check it. That function loops over all of the objects in the promisor packfile, including the tree we're currently walking. When we're done with it there, we free the tree buffer. But as we return to the walk in process_tree_contents(), it's still holding on to a pointer to that buffer, via its tree_desc iterator, and it accesses the freed memory. Even a trivial use of "--missing=allow-promisor" triggers this problem, as the included test demonstrates (it's just a vanilla --blob:none clone). We can detect this case by only freeing the tree buffer if it was allocated on our behalf. This is a little tricky since that happens inside parse_object(), and it doesn't tell us whether the object was already parsed, or whether it allocated the buffer itself. But by checking for an already-parsed tree beforehand, we can distinguish the two cases. That feels a little hacky, and does incur an extra lookup in the object-hash table. But that cost is fairly minimal compared to actually loading objects (and since we're iterating the whole pack here, we're likely to be loading most objects, rather than reusing cached results). It may also be a good direction for this function in general, as there are other possible optimizations that rely on doing some analysis before parsing: - we could detect blobs and avoid reading their contents; they can't link to other objects, but parse_object() doesn't know that we don't care about checking their hashes. - we could avoid allocating object structs entirely for most objects (since we really only need them in the oidset), which would save some memory. - promisor commits could use the commit-graph rather than loading the object from disk This commit doesn't do any of those optimizations, but I think it argues that this direction is reasonable, rather than relying on parse_object() and trying to teach it to give us more information about whether it parsed. The included test fails reliably under SANITIZE=address just when running "rev-list --missing=allow-promisor". Checking the output isn't strictly necessary to detect the bug, but it seems like a reasonable addition given the general lack of coverage for "allow-promisor" in the test suite. Reported-by: Andrew Olsen <andrew.olsen@koordinates.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2022-08-10Merge branch 'ma/t4200-update' into maintJunio C Hamano
Test fix. source: <20220718154322.2177166-1-martin.agren@gmail.com> * ma/t4200-update: t4200: drop irrelevant code
2022-08-10Merge branch 'tb/commit-graph-genv2-upgrade-fix' into maintJunio C Hamano
There was a bug in the codepath to upgrade generation information in commit-graph from v1 to v2 format, which has been corrected. source: <cover.1657667404.git.me@ttaylorr.com> * tb/commit-graph-genv2-upgrade-fix: commit-graph: fix corrupt upgrade from generation v1 to v2 commit-graph: introduce `repo_find_commit_pos_in_graph()` t5318: demonstrate commit-graph generation v2 corruption
2022-08-10Merge branch 'tk/untracked-cache-with-uall' into maintJunio C Hamano
Fix for a bug that makes write-tree to fail to write out a non-existent index as a tree, introduced in 2.37. source: <20220722212232.833188-1-martin.agren@gmail.com> * tk/untracked-cache-with-uall: read-cache: make `do_read_index()` always set up `istate->repo`
2022-08-10Merge branch 'mt/checkout-count-fix' into maintJunio C Hamano
"git checkout" miscounted the paths it updated, which has been corrected. source: <cover.1657799213.git.matheus.bernardino@usp.br> * mt/checkout-count-fix: checkout: fix two bugs on the final count of updated entries checkout: show bug about failed entries being included in final report checkout: document bug where delayed checkout counts entries twice
2022-08-10Merge branch 'hx/lookup-commit-in-graph-fix' into maintJunio C Hamano
A corner case bug where lazily fetching objects from a promisor remote resulted in infinite recursion has been corrected. source: <cover.1656593279.git.hanxin.hx@bytedance.com> * hx/lookup-commit-in-graph-fix: t5330: remove run_with_limited_processses() commit-graph.c: no lazy fetch in lookup_commit_in_graph()
2022-08-10Merge branch 'jc/resolve-undo' into maintJunio C Hamano
The resolve-undo information in the index was not protected against GC, which has been corrected. source: <xmqq35f7kzad.fsf@gitster.g> * jc/resolve-undo: fsck: do not dereference NULL while checking resolve-undo data revision: mark blobs needed for resolve-undo as reachable
2022-08-10fsck: downgrade tree badFilemode to "info"Jeff King
The previous commit un-broke the "badFileMode" check; before then it was literally testing nothing. And as far as I can tell, it has been so since the very initial version of fsck. The current severity of "badFileMode" is just "warning". But in the --strict mode used by transfer.fsckObjects, that is elevated to an error. This will potentially cause hassle for users, because historical objects with bad modes will suddenly start causing pushes to many server operators to be rejected. At the same time, these bogus modes aren't actually a big risk. Because we canonicalize them everywhere besides fsck, they can't cause too much mischief in the real world. The worst thing you can do is end up with two almost-identical trees that have different hashes but are interpreted the same. That will generally cause things to be inefficient rather than wrong, and is a bug somebody working on a Git implementation would want to fix, but probably not worth inconveniencing users by refusing to push or fetch. So let's downgrade this to "info" by default, which is our setting for "mention this when fscking, but don't ever reject, even under strict mode". If somebody really wants to be paranoid, they can still adjust the level using config. Suggested-by: Xavier Morel <xavier.morel@masklinn.net> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2022-08-10fsck: actually detect bad file modes in treesJeff King
We use the normal tree_desc code to iterate over trees in fsck, meaning we only see the canonicalized modes it returns. And hence we'd never see anything unexpected, since it will coerce literally any garbage into one of our normal and accepted modes. We can use the new RAW_MODES flag to see the real modes, and then use the existing code to actually analyze them. The existing code is written as allow-known-good, so there's not much point in testing a variety of breakages. The one tested here should be S_IFREG but with nonsense permissions. Do note that the error-reporting here isn't great. We don't mention the specific bad mode, but just that the tree has one or more broken modes. But when you go to look at it with "git ls-tree", we'll report the canonicalized mode! This isn't ideal, but given that this should come up rarely, and that any number of other tree corruptions might force you into looking at the binary bytes via "cat-file", it's not the end of the world. And it's something we can improve on top later if we choose. Reported-by: Xavier Morel <xavier.morel@masklinn.net> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2022-08-08unpack-trees: unpack new trees as sparse directoriesVictoria Dye
If 'unpack_single_entry()' is unpacking a new directory tree (that is, one not already present in the index) into a sparse index, unpack the tree as a sparse directory rather than traversing its contents and unpacking each file individually. This helps keep the sparse index as collapsed as possible in cases such as 'git reset --hard' restoring a outside-of-cone directory removed with 'git rm -r --sparse'. Without this patch, 'unpack_single_entry()' will only unpack a directory into the index as a sparse directory (rather than traversing into it and unpacking its files one-by-one) if an entry with the same name already exists in the index. This patch allows sparse directory unpacking without a matching index entry when the following conditions are met: 1. the directory's path is outside the sparse cone, and 2. there are no children of the directory in the index If a directory meets these requirements (as determined by 'is_new_sparse_dir()'), 'unpack_single_entry()' unpacks the sparse directory index entry and propagates the decision back up to 'unpack_callback()' to prevent unnecessary tree traversal into the unpacked directory. Reported-by: Shaoxuan Yuan <shaoxuan.yuan02@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Victoria Dye <vdye@github.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2022-08-08checkout: fix nested sparse directory diff in sparse indexVictoria Dye
Add the 'recursive' diff flag to the local changes reporting done by 'git checkout' in 'show_local_changes()'. Without the flag enabled, unexpanded sparse directories will not be recursed into to report the diff of each file's contents, resulting in the reported local changes including "modified" sparse directories. The same issue was found and fixed for 'git status' in 2c521b0e49 (status: fix nested sparse directory diff in sparse index, 2022-03-01) Signed-off-by: Victoria Dye <vdye@github.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>