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* fixes/2.45.1/2.44:
Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir"
Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents"
clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run
tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again
Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning"
init: use the correct path of the templates directory again
hook: plug a new memory leak
ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc
ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job
ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable
send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object
send-email: drop FakeTerm hack
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* fixes/2.45.1/2.43:
Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir"
Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents"
clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run
tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again
Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning"
init: use the correct path of the templates directory again
hook: plug a new memory leak
ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc
ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job
ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable
send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object
send-email: drop FakeTerm hack
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* fixes/2.45.1/2.42:
Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir"
Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents"
clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run
tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again
Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning"
init: use the correct path of the templates directory again
hook: plug a new memory leak
ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc
ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job
ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable
send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object
send-email: drop FakeTerm hack
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* fixes/2.45.1/2.41:
Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir"
Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents"
clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run
tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again
Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning"
init: use the correct path of the templates directory again
hook: plug a new memory leak
ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc
ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job
ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable
send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object
send-email: drop FakeTerm hack
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* fixes/2.45.1/2.40:
Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir"
Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents"
clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run
tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again
Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning"
init: use the correct path of the templates directory again
hook: plug a new memory leak
ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc
ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job
ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable
send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object
send-email: drop FakeTerm hack
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Revert overly aggressive "layered defence" that went into 2.45.1
and friends, which broke "git-lfs", "git-annex", and other use
cases, so that we can rebuild necessary counterparts in the open.
* jc/fix-2.45.1-and-friends-for-2.39:
Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir"
Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents"
clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run
tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again
Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning"
init: use the correct path of the templates directory again
hook: plug a new memory leak
ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc
ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job
ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable
send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object
send-email: drop FakeTerm hack
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As part of the security bug-fix releases v2.39.4, ..., v2.45.1, I
introduced logic to safeguard `git clone` from running hooks that were
installed _during_ the clone operation.
The rationale was that Git's CVE-2024-32002, CVE-2021-21300,
CVE-2019-1354, CVE-2019-1353, CVE-2019-1352, and CVE-2019-1349 should
have been low-severity vulnerabilities but were elevated to
critical/high severity by the attack vector that allows a weakness where
files inside `.git/` can be inadvertently written during a `git clone`
to escalate to a Remote Code Execution attack by virtue of installing a
malicious `post-checkout` hook that Git will then run at the end of the
operation without giving the user a chance to see what code is executed.
Unfortunately, Git LFS uses a similar strategy to install its own
`post-checkout` hook during a `git clone`; In fact, Git LFS is
installing four separate hooks while running the `smudge` filter.
While this pattern is probably in want of being improved by introducing
better support in Git for Git LFS and other tools wishing to register
hooks to be run at various stages of Git's commands, let's undo the
clone protections to unbreak Git LFS-enabled clones.
This reverts commit 8db1e8743c0 (clone: prevent hooks from running
during a clone, 2024-03-28).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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* maint-2.44: (41 commits)
Git 2.44.1
Git 2.43.4
Git 2.42.2
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
...
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* maint-2.43: (40 commits)
Git 2.43.4
Git 2.42.2
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
...
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* maint-2.42: (39 commits)
Git 2.42.2
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
...
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* maint-2.41: (38 commits)
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
...
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* maint-2.40: (39 commits)
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default
...
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* maint-2.39: (38 commits)
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default
fetch/clone: detect dubious ownership of local repositories
...
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This topic addresses two CVEs:
- CVE-2024-32020:
Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
object database when source and target repository reside on the same
disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
untrusted user.
- CVE-2024-32021:
When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
directory.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Critical security issues typically combine relatively common
vulnerabilities such as case confusion in file paths with other
weaknesses in order to raise the severity of the attack.
One such weakness that has haunted the Git project in many a
submodule-related CVE is that any hooks that are found are executed
during a clone operation. Examples are the `post-checkout` and
`fsmonitor` hooks.
However, Git's design calls for hooks to be disabled by default, as only
disabled example hooks are copied over from the templates in
`<prefix>/share/git-core/templates/`.
As a defense-in-depth measure, let's prevent those hooks from running.
Obviously, administrators can choose to drop enabled hooks into the
template directory, though, _and_ it is also possible to override
`core.hooksPath`, in which case the new check needs to be disabled.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When performing a local clone of a repository we end up either copying
or hardlinking the source repository into the target repository. This is
significantly more performant than if we were to use git-upload-pack(1)
and git-fetch-pack(1) to create the new repository and preserves both
disk space and compute time.
Unfortunately though, performing such a local clone of a repository that
is not owned by the current user is inherently unsafe:
- It is possible that source files get swapped out underneath us while
we are copying or hardlinking them. While we do perform some checks
here to assert that we hardlinked the expected file, they cannot
reliably thwart time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) style races. It
is thus possible for an adversary to make us copy or hardlink
unexpected files into the target directory.
Ideally, we would address this by starting to use openat(3P),
fstatat(3P) and friends. Due to platform compatibility with Windows
we cannot easily do that though. Furthermore, the scope of these
fixes would likely be quite broad and thus not fit for an embargoed
security release.
- Even if we handled TOCTOU-style races perfectly, hardlinking files
owned by a different user into the target repository is not a good
idea in general. It is possible for an adversary to rewrite those
files to contain whatever data they want even after the clone has
completed.
Address these issues by completely refusing local clones of a repository
that is not owned by the current user. This reuses our existing infra we
have in place via `ensure_valid_ownership()` and thus allows a user to
override the safety guard by adding the source repository path to the
"safe.directory" configuration.
This addresses CVE-2024-32020.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When performing local clones with hardlinks we refuse to copy source
files which are symlinks as a mitigation for CVE-2022-39253. This check
can be raced by an adversary though by changing the file to a symlink
after we have checked it.
Fix the issue by checking whether the hardlinked destination file
matches the source file and abort in case it doesn't.
This addresses CVE-2024-32021.
Reported-by: Apple Product Security <product-security@apple.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When a user performs a local clone without `--no-local`, then we end up
copying the source repository into the target repository directly. To
optimize this even further, we try to hardlink files into place instead
of copying data over, which helps both disk usage and speed.
There is an important edge case in this context though, namely when we
try to hardlink symlinks from the source repository into the target
repository. Depending on both platform and filesystem the resulting
behaviour here can be different:
- On macOS and NetBSD, calling link(3P) with a symlink target creates
a hardlink to the file pointed to by the symlink.
- On Linux, calling link(3P) instead creates a hardlink to the symlink
itself.
To unify this behaviour, 36596fd2df (clone: better handle symlinked
files at .git/objects/, 2019-07-10) introduced logic to resolve symlinks
before we try to link(3P) files. Consequently, the new behaviour was to
always create a hard link to the target of the symlink on all platforms.
Eventually though, we figured out that following symlinks like this can
cause havoc when performing a local clone of a malicious repository,
which resulted in CVE-2022-39253. This issue was fixed via 6f054f9fb3
(builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks, 2022-07-28),
by refusing symlinks in the source repository.
But even though we now shouldn't ever link symlinks anymore, the code
that resolves symlinks still exists. In the best case the code does not
end up doing anything because there are no symlinks anymore. In the
worst case though this can be abused by an adversary that rewrites the
source file after it has been checked not to be a symlink such that it
actually is a symlink when we call link(3P). Thus, it is still possible
to recreate CVE-2022-39253 due to this time-of-check-time-of-use bug.
Remove the call to `realpath()`. This doesn't yet address the actual
vulnerability, which will be handled in a subsequent commit.
Reported-by: Apple Product Security <product-security@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Work to support a repository that work with both SHA-1 and SHA-256
hash algorithms has started.
* eb/hash-transition: (30 commits)
t1016-compatObjectFormat: add tests to verify the conversion between objects
t1006: test oid compatibility with cat-file
t1006: rename sha1 to oid
test-lib: compute the compatibility hash so tests may use it
builtin/ls-tree: let the oid determine the output algorithm
object-file: handle compat objects in check_object_signature
tree-walk: init_tree_desc take an oid to get the hash algorithm
builtin/cat-file: let the oid determine the output algorithm
rev-parse: add an --output-object-format parameter
repository: implement extensions.compatObjectFormat
object-file: update object_info_extended to reencode objects
object-file-convert: convert commits that embed signed tags
object-file-convert: convert commit objects when writing
object-file-convert: don't leak when converting tag objects
object-file-convert: convert tag objects when writing
object-file-convert: add a function to convert trees between algorithms
object: factor out parse_mode out of fast-import and tree-walk into in object.h
cache: add a function to read an OID of a specific algorithm
tag: sign both hashes
commit: export add_header_signature to support handling signatures on tags
...
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Error message updates.
* as/option-names-in-messages:
revision.c: trivial fix to message
builtin/clone.c: trivial fix of message
builtin/remote.c: trivial fix of error message
transport-helper.c: trivial fix of error message
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A custom remote helper no longer cannot access the newly created
repository during "git clone", which is a regression in Git 2.44.
This has been corrected.
* ps/remote-helper-repo-initialization-fix:
builtin/clone: allow remote helpers to detect repo
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"git merge-tree" has learned that the three trees involved in the
3-way merge only need to be trees, not necessarily commits.
* js/merge-tree-3-trees:
fill_tree_descriptor(): mark error message for translation
cache-tree: avoid an unnecessary check
Always check `parse_tree*()`'s return value
t4301: verify that merge-tree fails on missing blob objects
merge-ort: do check `parse_tree()`'s return value
merge-tree: fail with a non-zero exit code on missing tree objects
merge-tree: accept 3 trees as arguments
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bare in that context is an option, not purely an adjective
Mark it properly
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shopov <ash@kambanaria.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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In 18c9cb7524 (builtin/clone: create the refdb with the correct object
format, 2023-12-12), we have changed git-clone(1) so that it delays
creation of the refdb until after it has learned about the remote's
object format. This change was required for the reftable backend, which
encodes the object format into the tables. So if we pre-initialized the
refdb with the default object format, but the remote uses a different
object format than that, then the resulting tables would have encoded
the wrong object format.
This change unfortunately breaks remote helpers which try to access the
repository that is about to be created. Because the refdb has not yet
been initialized at the point where we spawn the remote helper, we also
don't yet have "HEAD" or "refs/". Consequently, any Git commands ran by
the remote helper which try to access the repository would fail because
it cannot be discovered.
This is essentially a chicken-and-egg problem: we cannot initialize the
refdb because we don't know about the object format. But we cannot learn
about the object format because the remote helper may be unable to
access the partially-initialized repository.
Ideally, we would address this issue via capabilities. But the remote
helper protocol is not structured in a way that guarantees that the
capability announcement happens before the remote helper tries to access
the repository.
Instead, fix this issue by partially initializing the refdb up to the
point where it becomes discoverable by Git commands.
Reported-by: Mike Hommey <mh@glandium.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Otherwise we may easily run into serious crashes: For example, if we run
`init_tree_desc()` directly after a failed `parse_tree()`, we are
accessing uninitialized data or trying to dereference `NULL`.
Note that the `parse_tree()` function already takes care of showing an
error message. The `parse_tree_indirectly()` and
`repo_get_commit_tree()` functions do not, therefore those latter call
sites need to show a useful error message while the former do not.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Remove unused header "#include".
* en/header-cleanup:
treewide: remove unnecessary includes in source files
treewide: add direct includes currently only pulled in transitively
trace2/tr2_tls.h: remove unnecessary include
submodule-config.h: remove unnecessary include
pkt-line.h: remove unnecessary include
line-log.h: remove unnecessary include
http.h: remove unnecessary include
fsmonitor--daemon.h: remove unnecessary includes
blame.h: remove unnecessary includes
archive.h: remove unnecessary include
treewide: remove unnecessary includes in source files
treewide: remove unnecessary includes from header files
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Clean-up code that handles combinations of incompatible options.
* rs/i18n-cannot-be-used-together:
i18n: factorize even more 'incompatible options' messages
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Introduce a new extension "refstorage" so that we can mark a
repository that uses a non-default ref backend, like reftable.
* ps/refstorage-extension:
t9500: write "extensions.refstorage" into config
builtin/clone: introduce `--ref-format=` value flag
builtin/init: introduce `--ref-format=` value flag
builtin/rev-parse: introduce `--show-ref-format` flag
t: introduce GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_REF_FORMAT envvar
setup: introduce GIT_DEFAULT_REF_FORMAT envvar
setup: introduce "extensions.refStorage" extension
setup: set repository's formats on init
setup: start tracking ref storage format
refs: refactor logic to look up storage backends
worktree: skip reading HEAD when repairing worktrees
t: introduce DEFAULT_REPO_FORMAT prereq
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Remove unused header "#include".
* en/header-cleanup:
treewide: remove unnecessary includes in source files
treewide: add direct includes currently only pulled in transitively
trace2/tr2_tls.h: remove unnecessary include
submodule-config.h: remove unnecessary include
pkt-line.h: remove unnecessary include
line-log.h: remove unnecessary include
http.h: remove unnecessary include
fsmonitor--daemon.h: remove unnecessary includes
blame.h: remove unnecessary includes
archive.h: remove unnecessary include
treewide: remove unnecessary includes in source files
treewide: remove unnecessary includes from header files
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Introduce a new `--ref-format` value flag for git-clone(1) that allows
the user to specify the ref format that is to be used for a newly
initialized repository.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Introduce a new "extensions.refStorage" extension that allows us to
specify the ref storage format used by a repository. For now, the only
supported format is the "files" format, but this list will likely soon
be extended to also support the upcoming "reftable" format.
There have been discussions on the Git mailing list in the past around
how exactly this extension should look like. One alternative [1] that
was discussed was whether it would make sense to model the extension in
such a way that backends are arbitrarily stackable. This would allow for
a combined value of e.g. "loose,packed-refs" or "loose,reftable", which
indicates that new refs would be written via "loose" files backend and
compressed into "packed-refs" or "reftable" backends, respectively.
It is arguable though whether this flexibility and the complexity that
it brings with it is really required for now. It is not foreseeable that
there will be a proliferation of backends in the near-term future, and
the current set of existing formats and formats which are on the horizon
can easily be configured with the much simpler proposal where we have a
single value, only.
Furthermore, if we ever see that we indeed want to gain the ability to
arbitrarily stack the ref formats, then we can adapt the current
extension rather easily. Given that Git clients will refuse any unknown
value for the "extensions.refStorage" extension they would also know to
ignore a stacked "loose,packed-refs" in the future.
So let's stick with the easy proposal for the time being and wire up the
extension.
[1]: <pull.1408.git.1667846164.gitgitgadget@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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In order to discern which ref storage format a repository is supposed to
use we need to start setting up and/or discovering the format. This
needs to happen in two separate code paths.
- The first path is when we create a repository via `init_db()`. When
we are re-initializing a preexisting repository we need to retain
the previously used ref storage format -- if the user asked for a
different format then this indicates an error and we error out.
Otherwise we either initialize the repository with the format asked
for by the user or the default format, which currently is the
"files" backend.
- The second path is when discovering repositories, where we need to
read the config of that repository. There is not yet any way to
configure something other than the "files" backend, so we can just
blindly set the ref storage format to this backend.
Wire up this logic so that we have the ref storage format always readily
available when needed. As there is only a single backend and because it
is not configurable we cannot yet verify that this tracking works as
expected via tests, but tests will be added in subsequent commits. To
countermand this ommission now though, raise a BUG() in case the ref
storage format is not set up properly in `ref_store_init()`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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"git clone" has been prepared to allow cloning a repository with
non-default hash function into a repository that uses the reftable
backend.
* ps/clone-into-reftable-repository:
builtin/clone: create the refdb with the correct object format
builtin/clone: skip reading HEAD when retrieving remote
builtin/clone: set up sparse checkout later
builtin/clone: fix bundle URIs with mismatching object formats
remote-curl: rediscover repository when fetching refs
setup: allow skipping creation of the refdb
setup: extract function to create the refdb
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Each of these were checked with
gcc -E -I. ${SOURCE_FILE} | grep ${HEADER_FILE}
to ensure that removing the direct inclusion of the header actually
resulted in that header no longer being included at all (i.e. that
no other header pulled it in transitively).
...except for a few cases where we verified that although the header
was brought in transitively, nothing from it was directly used in
that source file. These cases were:
* builtin/credential-cache.c
* builtin/pull.c
* builtin/send-pack.c
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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* ps/clone-into-reftable-repository:
builtin/clone: create the refdb with the correct object format
builtin/clone: skip reading HEAD when retrieving remote
builtin/clone: set up sparse checkout later
builtin/clone: fix bundle URIs with mismatching object formats
remote-curl: rediscover repository when fetching refs
setup: allow skipping creation of the refdb
setup: extract function to create the refdb
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Some codepaths did not correctly parse configuration variables
specified with valueless "true", which has been corrected.
* jk/implicit-true:
fsck: handle NULL value when parsing message config
trailer: handle NULL value when parsing trailer-specific config
submodule: handle NULL value when parsing submodule.*.branch
help: handle NULL value for alias.* config
trace2: handle NULL values in tr2_sysenv config callback
setup: handle NULL value when parsing extensions
config: handle NULL value when parsing non-bools
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We're currently creating the reference database with a potentially
incorrect object format when the remote repository's object format is
different from the local default object format. This works just fine for
now because the files backend never records the object format anywhere.
But this logic will fail with any new reference backend that encodes
this information in some form either on-disk or in-memory.
The preceding commits have reshuffled code in git-clone(1) so that there
is no code path that will access the reference database before we have
detected the remote's object format. With these refactorings we can now
defer initialization of the reference database until after we have
learned the remote's object format and thus initialize it with the
correct format from the get-go.
These refactorings are required to make git-clone(1) work with the
upcoming reftable backend when cloning repositories with the SHA256
object format.
This change breaks a test in "t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh" when cloning an
empty repository with `GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_HASH=sha256`. The test expects
the resulting hash format of the empty cloned repository to match the
default hash, but now we always end up with a sha1 repository. The
problem is that for dumb HTTP fetches, we have no easy way to figure out
the remote's hash function except for deriving it based on the hash
length of refs in `info/refs`. But as the remote repository is empty we
cannot rely on this detection mechanism.
Before the change in this commit we already initialized the repository
with the default hash function and then left it as-is. With this patch
we always use the hash function detected via the remote, where we fall
back to "sha1" in case we cannot detect it.
Neither the old nor the new behaviour are correct as we second-guess the
remote hash function in both cases. But given that this is a rather
unlikely edge case (we use the dumb HTTP protocol, the remote repository
uses SHA256 and the remote repository is empty), let's simply adapt the
test to assert the new behaviour. If we want to properly address this
edge case in the future we will have to extend the dumb HTTP protocol so
that we can properly detect the hash function for empty repositories.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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After we have set up the remote configuration in git-clone(1) we'll call
`remote_get()` to read the remote from the on-disk configuration. But
next to reading the on-disk configuration, `remote_get()` will also
cause us to try and read the repository's HEAD reference so that we can
figure out the current branch. Besides being pointless in git-clone(1)
because we're operating in an empty repository anyway, this will also
break once we move creation of the reference database to a later point
in time.
Refactor the code to introduce a new `remote_get_early()` function that
will skip reading the HEAD reference to address this issue.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When asked to do a sparse checkout, then git-clone(1) will spawn
`git sparse-checkout set` to set up the configuration accordingly. This
requires a proper Git repository or otherwise the command will fail. But
as we are about to move creation of the reference database to a later
point, this prerequisite will not hold anymore.
Move the logic to a later point in time where we know to have created
the reference database already.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We create the reference database in git-clone(1) quite early before
connecting to the remote repository. Given that we do not yet know about
the object format that the remote repository uses at that point in time
the consequence is that the refdb may be initialized with the wrong
object format.
This is not a problem in the context of the files backend as we do not
encode the object format anywhere, and furthermore the only reference
that we write between initializing the refdb and learning about the
object format is the "HEAD" symref. It will become a problem though once
we land the reftable backend, which indeed does require to know about
the proper object format at the time of creation. We thus need to
rearrange the logic in git-clone(1) so that we only initialize the refdb
once we have learned about the actual object format.
As a first step, move listing of remote references to happen earlier,
which also allow us to set up the hash algorithm of the repository
earlier now. While we aim to execute this logic as late as possible
until after most of the setup has happened already, detection of the
object format and thus later the setup of the reference database must
happen before any other logic that may spawn Git commands or otherwise
these Git commands may not recognize the repository as such.
The first Git step where we expect the repository to be fully initalized
is when we fetch bundles via bundle URIs. Funny enough, the comments
there also state that "the_repository must match the cloned repo", which
is indeed not necessarily the case for the hash algorithm right now. So
in practice it is the right thing to detect the remote's object format
before downloading bundle URIs anyway, and not doing so causes clones
with bundle URIs to fail when the local default object format does not
match the remote repository's format.
Unfortunately though, this creates a new issue: downloading bundles may
take a long time, so if we list refs beforehand they might've grown
stale meanwhile. It is not clear how to solve this issue except for a
second reference listing though after we have downloaded the bundles,
which may be an expensive thing to do.
Arguably though, it's preferable to have a staleness issue compared to
being unable to clone a repository altogether.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When the config parser sees an "implicit" bool like:
[core]
someVariable
it passes NULL to the config callback. Any callback code which expects a
string must check for NULL. This usually happens via helpers like
git_config_string(), etc, but some custom code forgets to do so and will
segfault.
These are all fairly vanilla cases where the solution is just the usual
pattern of:
if (!value)
return config_error_nonbool(var);
though note that in a few cases we have to split initializers like:
int some_var = initializer();
into:
int some_var;
if (!value)
return config_error_nonbool(var);
some_var = initializer();
There are still some broken instances after this patch, which I'll
address on their own in individual patches after this one.
Reported-by: Carlos Andrés Ramírez Cataño <antaigroupltda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Continue the work of 12909b6b8a (i18n: turn "options are incompatible"
into "cannot be used together", 2022-01-05) and a699367bb8 (i18n:
factorize more 'incompatible options' messages, 2022-01-31) to use the
same parameterized error message for reporting incompatible command line
options. This reduces the number of strings to translate and makes the
UI slightly more consistent.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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To make it possible for git ls-tree to display the tree encoded
in the hash algorithm of the oid specified to git ls-tree, update
init_tree_desc to take as a parameter the oid of the tree object.
Update all callers of init_tree_desc and init_tree_desc_gently
to pass the oid of the tree object.
Use the oid of the tree object to discover the hash algorithm
of the oid and store that hash algorithm in struct tree_desc.
Use the hash algorithm in decode_tree_entry and
update_tree_entry_internal to handle reading a tree object encoded in
a hash algorithm that differs from the repositories hash algorithm.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Command line parser fixes.
* jc/transport-parseopt-fix:
fetch: reject --no-ipv[46]
parse-options: introduce OPT_IPVERSION()
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The command line option parsing for "git clone", "git fetch", and
"git push" have duplicated implementations of parsing "--ipv4" and
"--ipv6" options, by having two OPT_SET_INT() for "ipv4" and "ipv6".
Introduce a new OPT_IPVERSION() macro and use it in these three
commands.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Further shuffling of declarations across header files to streamline
file dependencies.
* cw/compat-util-header-cleanup:
git-compat-util: move alloc macros to git-compat-util.h
treewide: remove unnecessary includes for wrapper.h
kwset: move translation table from ctype
sane-ctype.h: create header for sane-ctype macros
git-compat-util: move wrapper.c funcs to its header
git-compat-util: move strbuf.c funcs to its header
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Reduce reliance on a global state in the config reading API.
* gc/config-context:
config: pass source to config_parser_event_fn_t
config: add kvi.path, use it to evaluate includes
config.c: remove config_reader from configsets
config: pass kvi to die_bad_number()
trace2: plumb config kvi
config.c: pass ctx with CLI config
config: pass ctx with config files
config.c: pass ctx in configsets
config: add ctx arg to config_fn_t
urlmatch.h: use config_fn_t type
config: inline git_color_default_config
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Signed-off-by: Calvin Wan <calvinwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Add a new "const struct config_context *ctx" arg to config_fn_t to hold
additional information about the config iteration operation.
config_context has a "struct key_value_info kvi" member that holds
metadata about the config source being read (e.g. what kind of config
source it is, the filename, etc). In this series, we're only interested
in .kvi, so we could have just used "struct key_value_info" as an arg,
but config_context makes it possible to add/adjust members in the future
without changing the config_fn_t signature. We could also consider other
ways of organizing the args (e.g. moving the config name and value into
config_context or key_value_info), but in my experiments, the
incremental benefit doesn't justify the added complexity (e.g. a
config_fn_t will sometimes invoke another config_fn_t but with a
different config value).
In subsequent commits, the .kvi member will replace the global "struct
config_reader" in config.c, making config iteration a global-free
operation. It requires much more work for the machinery to provide
meaningful values of .kvi, so for now, merely change the signature and
call sites, pass NULL as a placeholder value, and don't rely on the arg
in any meaningful way.
Most of the changes are performed by
contrib/coccinelle/config_fn_ctx.pending.cocci, which, for every
config_fn_t:
- Modifies the signature to accept "const struct config_context *ctx"
- Passes "ctx" to any inner config_fn_t, if needed
- Adds UNUSED attributes to "ctx", if needed
Most config_fn_t instances are easily identified by seeing if they are
called by the various config functions. Most of the remaining ones are
manually named in the .cocci patch. Manual cleanups are still needed,
but the majority of it is trivial; it's either adjusting config_fn_t
that the .cocci patch didn't catch, or adding forward declarations of
"struct config_context ctx" to make the signatures make sense.
The non-trivial changes are in cases where we are invoking a config_fn_t
outside of config machinery, and we now need to decide what value of
"ctx" to pass. These cases are:
- trace2/tr2_cfg.c:tr2_cfg_set_fl()
This is indirectly called by git_config_set() so that the trace2
machinery can notice the new config values and update its settings
using the tr2 config parsing function, i.e. tr2_cfg_cb().
- builtin/checkout.c:checkout_main()
This calls git_xmerge_config() as a shorthand for parsing a CLI arg.
This might be worth refactoring away in the future, since
git_xmerge_config() can call git_default_config(), which can do much
more than just parsing.
Handle them by creating a KVI_INIT macro that initializes "struct
key_value_info" to a reasonable default, and use that to construct the
"ctx" arg.
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The vast majority of files including object-store.h did not need dir.h
nor khash.h. Split the header into two files, and let most just depend
upon object-store-ll.h, while letting the two callers that need it
depend on the full object-store.h.
After this patch:
$ git grep -h include..object-store | sort | uniq -c
2 #include "object-store.h"
129 #include "object-store-ll.h"
Diff best viewed with `--color-moved`.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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